





The Constitution in a Brave New
World: A Century of Technological
Change and Constitutional Law
May Science and her handmaid Art,
To this new world belong!
And infant muses joy impart
In strains of sportive song!-
Apollo see! with glory drest,
Appears refulgent in the west.
America is thus become
A seat to freedom dear,
Where virtuous strangers find a home,
And no oppression fear.
These rising States shall be renown'd
By Plenty, Art, and Science crown'd.
From "The Fabrick of Freedom," a song published in 1788,
during debates over ratification of the Constitution.'
There is a fundamental natural right expressed in our Consti-
tution as the "right to liberty," which permits an individual to
refuse or direct the withholding or withdrawal of artificial death
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign College of
Law. B.A., 1977, Harvard; J.D., 1980, Columbia.
I Williams, The Fabrick of Freedom (1788), reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY His-
TORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 360, 361 (J. Kaminski & G.
Saladino eds. 1986).
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prolonging procedures .... To decide otherwise . . . in effect
gives one's body to medical science without their consent. We
could then sing, less fervently of the land of the free, but as medi-
cal science advances to new horizons, much more fervently of the
land of the brave.
Judge Higgins, dissenting from the Missouri
Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan v. Harmon.
2
T WENTIETH century society is far different from the eight-
eenth century world inhabited by the Constitution's Framers.
Nuclear power, genetic engineering, and high speed computers
would astound James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and their col-
leagues. Likewise, the politicians who drafted and ratified the four-
teenth amendment barely dreamed of space shuttles, television sets,
or heart transplants. In the last half of the nineteenth century, who
could have foreseen that the heart of one human being would beat
successfully in the chest of another or that mechanical respirators
would keep alive comatose patients who had stopped breathing on
their own?
During the last 100 years, courts have struggled to apply an
eighteenth century Constitution to twentieth century technology.
Universal vaccination, eugenic sterilization, computerized data
banks, and mechanical respirators are among the technologies that
have challenged constitutional doctrine. In applying constitutional
guarantees of due process, equal protection, and privacy, courts
have significantly shaped the use of technology. At the same time,
the unrelenting march of technological change has permanently al-
tered the course of constitutional law.
Now, the United States Supreme Court stands at the threshold of
another confrontation between the Constitution and modern tech-
nology. In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,3 the
Court will decide whether a patient in a permanent vegetative state
has the constitutional right to demand withdrawal of a surgically
implanted feeding tube.4 Whatever the Court's decision, the case
already has provoked widespread debate and commentary.
This Article explores the interplay between constitutional law
and technological change during the last 100 years.5 The first part
2 760 S.W.2d 408, 434 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (quoting from the trial court's opinion),
cert. granted sub nor. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
3 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
4 Because the patient is incompetent, the Court must also decide whether the pa-
tient's guardians may assert any such right on her behalf. For further discussion of
Cruzan, see infra notes 89-93, 127-28 and accompanying text.
5 Several other scholars have studied the interaction between technology and consti-
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of the Article outlines four controversies, including the right-to-die
disputes epitomized by Cruzan, in which litigants invoked constitu-
tional rights to restrain the use of new technologies. The second
part of the Article analyzes four trends emerging from these deci-
sions. First, courts during the last 100 years have grown increas-
ingly wary of technological change. Judges today are more likely
than their predecessors to vindicate individual rights over techno-
logical progress. Second, this caution has accompanied, and per-
haps precipitated, a shift in the courts' constitutional philosophy.
Although courts once shaped constitutional principles around an
implied social contract, they now focus on individual rights as the
starting point for constitutional analysis. Third, lawsuits challeng-
ing new technologies have spawned a surprising number of new
constitutional doctrines. Technology not only has tested constitu-
tional law, but has enriched it. Finally, courts adjudicating conflicts
between technology and constitutional law have become arbiters of
technological and social change. Rather than simply resolving the
specific controversies before them, judges have probed the deeper
ethical and social stresses generated by new technologies. As the
twenty-first century unveils still more technological marvels, liti-
gants increasingly will ask the courts to resolve these social and eth-
ical conundrums.
I
TECHNOLOGY IN THE COURTROOM: FOUR CASE STUDIES
New technologies have tested almost every constitutional provi-
sion. Courts struggle to reconcile the first amendment with meth-
ods of communication, such as loudspeakers, radio, and television.6
tutional law, although from different perspectives than the one presented here. See, e.g.,
Conley, "The First Principle of Real Reform'": The Role of Science in Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 65 N.C.L. REV. 935 (1987); Frampton, Scientific Eclat and Technologi-
cal Change: Some Implications for Legal Education, 63 MIcH. L. REV. 1423 (1965);
Gibbons, The Relationship Between Law and Science, 22 IDEA 43, 159, 227, 283
(1980); Jasanoff & Nelkin, Science, Technology, and the Limits of Judicial Competence,
22 JURIMETRICS J. 266 (1982); Miller, Technology, Social Change, and the Constitution,
33 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 17 (1964); United States Congress, Office of Technology As-
sessment, Biology, Medicine, and the Bill of Rights-A Special Report, OTA-CIT-371
(1988).
6See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989) (upholding city's
sound-amplification guidelines for park bandshell); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726 (1978) (upholding informal censure of radio station for broadcasting offensive lan-
guage); Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding application of
fairness doctrine to television station); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding
ordinance prohibiting use of sound trucks on public streets).
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Airplanes, electronic tracking devices, and automobiles challenge
fourth amendment doctrine.7 Even the basic structure of federalism
has shifted under the strains of modern technology.8 Rather than
catalogue all of these technological influences on constitutional law,
this Article focuses on four technologies that span the last century
and provoked widespread constitutional challenges: universal vac-
cination, eugenic sterilization, computerized data banks, and life-
prolonging medical techniques. A detailed examination of these
controversies provides a starting point for exploring the complex
relationship between constitutional law and technological change.
A. Universal Vaccination
Vaccination against smallpox was one of the first technologies to
generate significant constitutional controversy.9 During the waning
years of the nineteenth century, many cities and towns required vac-
cinations of their citizens.'" Most citizens welcomed vaccination as
an effective preventive of smallpox, but a few resisted this unprece-
dented and "practically compulsory inoculation of their bodies with
a virus."" These dissidents raised a host of constitutional objec-
tions to vaccination, including claims that compulsory vaccination
violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the four-
teenth amendment. 12
7 See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693 (1989) (aerial observation from helicopter
hovering 400 feet above ground did not violate fourth amendment); United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (warrantless monitoring of an electronic tracking device
did not violate fourth amendment when it revealed no information that could not have
been obtained through visual surveillance); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)
(warrantless search of automobile did not violate fourth amendment when officers had
probable cause to suspect the presence of contraband).
s See Miller, supra note 5, at 24-40.
9 The first constitutional attack on vaccination arose in 1830. In Hazen v. Strong, 2
Vt. 427 (1830), a Vermont resident claimed the town he lived in had exceeded its consti-
tutional powers by seizing his cow to help defray the costs of smallpox inoculation. The
Vermont Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the town's inoculation
program.
10 Vaccination against smallpox was known even before the nineteenth century. Be-
tween 1796 and 1798, Edward Jenner showed that an inoculation with cowpox could
prevent smallpox. 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA (Macropedia) Jenner, Edward 133
(1974). Fifteen years later, Congress passed a law encouraging the use of smallpox
vaccine. Act of Feb. 27, 1813, ch. 37, 2 Stat. 806 (repealed 1822). Compulsory vaccina-
tion did not become widespread in the United States, however, until the last quarter of
the nineteenth century.
II Potts v. Breen, 167 I1. 67, 76, 47 N.E. 81, 84 (1897). Some physicians also op-
posed vaccination as dangerous. See. e.g., Viemeister v. White, 179 N.Y. 235, 239, 72
N.E. 97, 98 (1904).
12 Other constitutional challenges, though unsuccessful, included claims that vaccina-
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Most state and federal courts readily rejected these constitutional
challenges to mandatory vaccination. In 1890, the California
Supreme Court upheld a statute requiring vaccinations of all chil-
dren attending public schools.' 3 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
approved a similar law four years later.14 In 1905, the United
States Supreme Court virtually ended the judicial debate over vacci-
nation by holding that compulsory smallpox vaccination did not vi-
olate the fourteenth amendment.15
These courts acknowledged that some lay people and physicians
opposed vaccination as ineffective or dangerous.' 6 However, wide-
spread support for the smallpox vaccine convinced judges that
mandatory vaccination was a reasonable exercise of the police
power and did not violate due process. The Connecticut Supreme
Court observed, "If vaccination is a preventive of small pox, as
claimed by what appears to be the great majority of the medical
profession, the requirement would seem to be a reasonable one."' 7
The United States Supreme Court concurred that in light of the
strong support for vaccination in "the experience of this and other
countries" compulsory smallpox vaccination was eminently
reasonable. 
18
Likewise, courts easily dismissed most equal protection attacks
tion violated the preamble and spirit of the Constitution, see Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11, 14 (1905), that conditioning school admission on vaccination violated state
constitutional provisions guaranteeing public education, see, e.g., Viemeister, 179 N.Y.
235, 72 N.E. 97, that mandatory vaccination violated state constitutional prohibitions
against unreasonable searches and seizures, see, e.g., McSween v. Board of School
Trustees, 60 Tex. Civ. App. 270, 274-75, 129 S.W. 206, 208 (1910), and that legislatures
had unconstitutionally delegated power over vaccination to an administrative body, see,
e.g., State ex rel. Adams v. Burdge, 95 Wis. 390, 70 N.W. 347 (1897). See also infra
note 22 and accompanying text (describing later challenges to vaccination based on
religious freedom).
13 Abeel v. Clark, 84 Cal. 226, 24 P. 383 (1890). The court did not explicitly discuss
the federal Constitution, but it held that compulsory vaccination was within the scope
of the police power. Id. at 230, 24 P. at 384.
14 Duffield v. School Dist. of City of Williamsport, 162 Pa. 476, 29 A. 742 (1894); see
also French v. Davidson, 143 Cal. 658, 77 P. 663 (1904); Bissell v. Davison, 65 Conn.
183, 32 A. 348 (1894); Morris v. City of Columbus, 102 Ga. 792, 30 S.E. 850 (1898);
State v. Hay, 126 N.C. 999, 35 S.E. 459 (1900); McSween, 60 Tex. Civ. App. 270, 129
S.W. 206.
15Jacobson, 197 U.S. 11; see also Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922) (peremptorily
rejecting constitutional challenge to vaccination on the authority of Jacobson).
16 See, e.g., Bissell, 65 Conn. at 192, 32 A. at 350; Viemeister, 179 N.Y. at 239-40, 72
N.E. at 98; Hay, 126 N.C. at 1002-03, 35 S.E. at 461.
17 Bissell, 65 Conn. at 192, 32 A. at 349.
18 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31. The Court cited extensive evidence of public support for
vaccination. Id. at 31-34 n.I.
OREGON LAW REVIEW
on mandatory vaccination. The Supreme Court upheld a statute
granting exceptions to some children but requiring all adults to sub-
mit to vaccination. "[T]he statute is applicable equally to all in like
condition," the Court reasoned, "and there are obviously reasons
why regulations may be appropriate for adults which could not be
safely applied to persons of tender years."' 9 Conversely, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court upheld vaccination requirements limited to
schoolchildren, finding these children constituted a "natural class"
of subjects for vaccination.2 °
Judicial support for the constitutionality of vaccination persists
through the present day. Modern courts continue to reject four-
teenth amendment challenges to vaccination, 2 ' and also turn aside
claims based on the first amendment's protection of religious free-
dom. Although the Constitution grants unlimited protection for
religious beliefs, it cannot shelter religious practices that threaten
public health.
22
Despite this long-standing support for the constitutionality of
universal vaccination, the courts have recognized some limits on the
state's power to compel vaccination. At the same time that it up-
held compulsory vaccination, the United States Supreme Court
warned that vaccination might exceed constitutional bounds if it
would "seriously impair [the] health or probably cause [the] death"
of a subject.2 3 The Supreme Court of North Carolina and several
lower federal courts agreed that "there may be some conditions of a
19 Id. at 30.
20 French v. Davidson, 143 Cal. 658, 662, 77 P. 663, 664 (1904). But see infra notes
25-27 and accompanying text (discussing distinctions that violated equal protection
clause).
21 See, e.g., Seubold v. Fort Smith Special School Dist., 218 Ark. 560, 237 S.W.2d 884
(1951); State v. Drew, 89 N.H. 54, 192 A. 629 (1937); Sadlock v. Board of Educ., 137
N.J.L. 85, 58 A.2d 218 (1948); cf. Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 455, 426 N.Y.S.2d
517, 536 (1980) (recognizing, in dictum, that the need for universal vaccination is a
compelling state interest that may overcome an individual's right to refuse medical
treatment), modified on other grounds sub nom. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420
N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
22 See, e.g., Wright v. DeWitt School Dist., 238 Ark. 906, 385 S.W.2d 644 (1965);
Cude v. State, 237 Ark. 927, 377 S.W.2d 816 (1964); Board of Educ. v. Maas, 56 N.J.
Super. 245, 152 A.2d 394 (1959), aff'd, 31 N.J. 537, 158 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 363
U.S. 843 (1960). The Massachusetts Supreme Court, however, struck down as discrimi-
natory part of a vaccination statute exempting members of "a recognized church or
religious denomination" but not other religious believers who opposed vaccination on
religious grounds. Dalli v. Board of Educ., 358 Mass. 753, 267 N.E.2d 219 (1971). The
court held that this exception violated the first amendment, the equal protection clause,
and the state constitution.
23 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 39.
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person's health when it would be unsafe to submit to vaccination,
and which, therefore, would be a sufficient excuse for noncompli-
ance" with a statute mandating vaccination.
24
The courts also invoked the equal protection clause to invalidate
vaccination laws that discriminated arbitrarily among classes of citi-
zens. In 1900, a federal court struck down a regulation requiring all
Chinese residents of San Francisco to receive a bubonic plague vac-
cine if they left the city.25 This regulation violated the equal protec-
tion clause because it subjected Chinese residents to "charges or
burdens ... which [were] not equally borne by others."'26 In reach-
ing this conclusion, the court summarily rejected the city's claim
that Chinese residents were more susceptible to the plague than
were San Francisco residents of other races.27
Finally, although courts repeatedly upheld "mandatory" vaccina-
tion, they never forced citizens to physically submit to vaccination.
The penalty for resisting compulsory vaccination usually was a
fine 21 or exclusion from school. 29 No reported decision ordered a
citizen to submit to vaccination. Indeed, several courts have sug-
gested that such an order might be unconstitutional.3 °
Thus, the courts have combined vigorous support for vaccination
24 State v. Hay, 126 N.C. 999, 35 S.E. 459, 461 (1900); see also Wong Wai v. William-
son, 103 F. 1, 7-8 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900) (resolution requiring Chinese residents of San
Francisco to receive bubonic plague vaccine was unconstitutional in part because the
vaccine could endanger the lives of persons already exposed to the disease); Hay, 126
N.C. at 1006, 35 S.E. at 462 (Douglas, J., concurring).
25 Wong Wai, 103 F. 1.
26 1d. at 9.
27 "No evidence has.., been offered to support this claim," the court observed, "and
it is not known to be a fact. This explanation must therefore be dismissed as unsatisfac-
tory." Id. at 7; see also Dalli, 358 Mass. 753, 267 N.E.2d 219 (vaccination statute that
excepted members of "a recognized church or religious denomination" who opposed
vaccination on religious grounds violated both first amendment and equal protection
clauses).
28 See, e.g., Jacobson, 197 U.S. 11 (five dollar fine); State v. Martin, 134 Ark. 420, 204
S.W. 622 (1918) ($10 fine).
29 See, e.g., French v. Davidson, 143 Cal. 658, 77 P. 663 (1904); Bissell v. Davison, 65
Conn. 183, 32 A. 348 (1894); McSween v. Board of School Trustees, 60 Tex. Civ. App.
270, 129 S.W. 206 (1910).
30 See, e.g., Martin, 134 Ark. at 428, 204 S.W. at 625 ("[Tihere is no American au-
thority for compulsory vaccination in the sense of forcing one to submit his person
thereto, but there is authority for penalizing one who refuses to comply with an order or
law requiring vaccination."); Duffield v. School Dist., 162 Pa. 476, 483, 29 A. 742, 742
(1894) ("It should be borne in mind that there is no effort to compel vaccination. The
school board do [sic] not claim that they can compel the plaintiff to vaccinate his son.
They claim only the right to exclude [him] from the schools .... "); McSween, 60 Tex.
Civ. App. at 274-75, 129 S.W. at 207-08 (noting that board of health merely excluded
unvaccinated children from school, and "did not compel vaccination"; therefore, board
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laws with the recognition that the Constitution imposes some limits
on those laws. The states may order their citizens to submit to vac-
cination, but they may not vaccinate citizens who would suffer seri-
ous physical harm from the vaccine, arbitrarily select one racial or
ethnic group for vaccination, or physically force recalcitrant citi-
zens to submit to the vaccine. Within these limits, courts have uni-
formly upheld the constitutionality of mandatory vaccination. 3'
B. Eugenic Sterilization
Shortly after the courts resolved the constitutionality of universal
vaccination, they faced constitutional challenges to a much more
intrusive use of new scientific principles. During the early years of
the twentieth century, students of Charles Darwin and Gregor
Mendel stressed the role of heredity in shaping human character
and intelligence. 32 A group of scientists and social leaders, styling
themselves "eugenicists," argued that mental retardation, epilepsy,
insanity, and even criminal tendencies were inherited traits.3 3 Re-
formers urged that the best way to control crime, insanity, and
other social problems was to sterilize individuals who manifested
these undesirable characteristics.
action did not violate state constitutional prohibition against unreasonable seizures or
searches); cf State v. Drew, 89 N.H. 54, 192 A. 629, 632 (1937):
We do not need to consider whether forcible vaccination by a public official
would be an assault under our statute as it now stands. There was not even an
attempt at such vaccination here. The defendant merely refused to send his
child to school vaccinated. So he must pay the penalty for not submitting to a
valid law.
31 In addition to the exceptions discussed in text, a few early decisions refused to
enforce school board directives excluding unvaccinated children from the public
schools. See Burroughs v. Mortenson, 312 Ill. 163, 143 N.E. 457 (1924); People ex rel.
Jenkins v. Board of Educ., 234 I11. 422, 84 N.E. 1046 (1908); People ex rel. Labaugh v.
Board of Educ., 177 111. 572, 52 N.E. 850 (1899); Potts v. Breen, 167 I11. 67, 47 N.E. 81
(1897); Wisconsin ex rel. Adams v. Burdge, 95 Wis. 390, 70 N.W. 347 (1897). These
rulings, however, rested on findings that the school boards lacked statutory authority to
issue the contested orders. The courts repeatedly suggested that the legislature had the
constitutional power to require vaccination of all school children by statute. See, e.g.,
Potts, 167 Ill. at 77-78, 47 N.E. at 85; Adams, 95 Wis. at 399, 70 N.W. at 351.
32 Selective breeding was not a new idea. Plato discussed selective breeding in his
Republic, and social reformers have advocated programs of selective breeding since that
time. See T. DOBZHANSKY, MANKIND EVOLVING 245 (1962); Vukowich, The Dawn-
ing of the Brave New World-Legal, Ethical and Social Issues of Genetics, 1971 U. ILL.
L.F. 189, 189. The new science of genetics gave these proposals a renewed sense of
urgency and a patina of scientific respectability during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.
33 Many respected scientists, of course, disagreed with the eugenic movement.
Cynkar, Buck v. BelL" "Felt Necessities" v. Fundamental Values?, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
1418, 1426 (1981).
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The eugenics platform won support in almost half the state legis-
latures. In 1907, Indiana passed the first eugenic sterilization stat-
ute, authorizing the sterilization of convicted criminals, idiots,
imbeciles, and rapists.34 By 1925, twenty-two other states had
passed laws permitting sterilization of at least some of these individ-
uals.35 Constitutional assaults on eugenic sterilization quickly
erupted in court.
Before 1940, many courts rejected these attacks and upheld the
constitutionality of eugenic sterilization. In 1912, for example, the
Supreme Court of Washington found that a statute authorizing ster-
ilization of habitual criminals and statutory rapists was compatible
with the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. If the legislature could punish criminal offenders by de-
priving them of their property, liberty, or lives, the court reasoned,
it could also deny convicted criminals their reproductive powers.
36
A few years later, the Supreme Court of Michigan upheld a stat-
ute authorizing the sterilization of all "mentally defective per-
sons." 37 The court declared that no person had the right "to beget
children with an inherited tendency to crime, feeble-mindedness, id-
iocy, or imbecility."38 Indeed, the danger of unrestrained reproduc-
tion was so great, according to this court, that the legislature had an
affirmative "duty[ ] to enact some legislation that would protect the
people and preserve the race from the known effects of the procrea-
tion of children by the feeble-minded, the idiots, and the
embeciles.
' 39
Even the United States Supreme Court affirmed the constitution-
ality of eugenic sterilization laws. In Buck v. Bell," the Court up-
held a Virginia statute authorizing sterilization of institutionalized
"mental defectives" whenever the superintendent of the institution
determined that sterilization was "for the best interests of the pa-
34 Act of Mar. 9, 1907, 1907 Ind. Acts ch. 215. For an overview of the history of
eugenics legislation in the United States, see Cynkar, supra note 33, at 1431-35.
35 Cynkar, supra note 33, at 1433 & n.76.
36 State v. Feilen, 70 Wash. 65, 126 P. 75 (1912).
37 Smith v. Command, 231 Mich. 409, 412, 204 N.W. 140, 141 (1925).
3 8 1d. at 415, 204 N.W. at 142.
3 9 1d. (emphasis added); see also State v. Troutman, 50 Idaho 673, 299 P. 668 (1931);
State ex rel. Smith v. Schaffer, 126 Kan. 607, 270 P. 604 (1928); In re Clayton, 120 Neb.
680, 234 N.W. 630 (1931); In re Main, 162 Okla. 65, 19 P.2d 153 (1933); Davis v.
Walton, 74 Utah 80, 276 P. 921 (1929); cf In re Opinion of the Justices, 230 Ala. 543,
162 So. 123 (1935) (mandatory sterilization is constitutional if state accords subject
procedural due process).
40 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
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tients and of society."'" Justice Holmes' infamous opinion for the
Court reasoned that, "[I]t is better for all the world, if ... society
can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their
kind."42 Referring to the fact that the mentally retarded plaintiff
had both a retarded mother and a retarded child, the Court coldly
declared, "Three generations of imbeciles are enough."43
This judicial solicitude for eugenic sterilization was not universal.
Before the Supreme Court's ruling in Buck v. Bell, several state
courts had invalidated eugenic sterilization measures. These courts
relied upon constitutional provisions as diverse as the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment,44 and the due process4 5 and
equal protection clauses.46 Together, these cases stressed the "hu-
miliation, the degradation, [and] the mental suffering" of compul-
sory sterilization.47 Eugenic sterilization, one court concluded,
"belongs to the Dark Ages."48
The Supreme Court substantially reversed its position on eugenic
sterilization in 1942. In Skinner v. Oklahoma,4 9 the Court struck
down an Oklahoma statute authorizing sterilization of most defend-
ants convicted two or more times of" 'felonies involving moral tur-
pitude.' "" The analysis began by noting that the statute
"touche[d] a sensitive and important area of human rights."'" Be-
cause the legislation affected "one of the basic civil rights," the
Court subjected it to especially strict scrutiny. 2 Examined under
41 Id. at 206.
4 2 Id. at 207.
43 Id.
44 Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F. 687 (D. Nev. 1918); Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413 (S.D.
Iowa 1914), rev'd on other grounds, 242 U.S. 468 (1917).
45 Williams v. Smith, 190 Ind. 526, 131 N.E. 2 (1921).
46 Haynes v. Lapeer, 201 Mich. 138, 166 N.W. 938 (1918); Smith v. Board of Exam-
iners, 85 N.J.L. 46, 88 A. 963 (1913); Osborn v. Thomson, 103 Misc. 23, 169 N.Y.S.
638, aff'd mem., 185 A.D. 902, 171 N.Y.S. 1094 (1918).
4 7 Davis, 216 F. at 416.
4 8 Id.; see also Smith v. Command, 231 Mich. 409, 204 N.W. 140 (1925):
When ... [the] power of the state is employed to destroy the virility of unfor-
tunate human beings . . . , we as a people invite atavism to the state of mind
evidenced in Sparta, ancient Rome, and the Dark Ages, where individuality
counted for naught against the mere animal breeding of human beings for
purposes of the state or tribe.
Id. at 430, 204 N.W. at 147 (Weist, J., dissenting); Osborn, 103 Misc. at 34, 169 N.Y.S.
at 644 (eugenic sterilization represents "a tendency almost inhuman in its nature").
49 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
5 0 d. at 536 (quoting OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 171 (West 1935)).
51 Id.
5
2 Id. at 541.
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that standard, the Court found that the statute violated the equal
protection clause because it arbitrarily excluded defendants con-
victed of embezzlement, political offenses, or violations of the pro-
hibitory laws and revenue acts.
5 3
The Court's Skinner decision stopped short of overruling Buck v.
Bell, but several commentators have suggested that the Court
would have to decide Buck v. Bell differently under Skinner's strict
scrutiny standard.54 Indeed, several modem courts have denounced
compulsory sterilization in the strongest terms. In 1981, the New
Jersey Supreme Court declared: "We flatly reject continued efforts
in recent times to justify compulsory sterilization for eugenics or
population control purposes."55 Several other courts, however,
have upheld sterilization programs that were carefully tailored to
serve a compelling state interest.56 Thus, the history of eugenic
sterilization in the courts continues to present a surprising mixture
of approbation and opposition.
C. Computerized Data Banks
During the last two decades, computerized data banks revolu-
tionized government recordkeeping. Before the advent of com-
puters, "the very ponderousness" of traditional recordkeeping
methods "inhibited man's urge to collect and preserve information
about his peers."57 Today, sophisticated computers can rapidly
store, analyze, and exchange large quantities of data. This technol-
ogy has enabled governments to compile extensive records about
the habits and characteristics of their citizens. As one critic com-
5 3 Id. at 541-42.
54 
See, e.g., 2 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 18.27, at 557 (1986); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 15-10, at 1339-40 (2d ed. 1988).
55 In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 247 n.3, 426 A.2d 467, 473 n.3 (1981); see also Motes v.
Hall County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 251 Ga. 373, 374, 306 S.E.2d 260, 262
(1983) (quoting Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541, for the proposition that procreation is a fun-
damental right and requiring clear and convincing evidence as the standard of proof in
involuntary sterilization proceedings).
56 See, e.g., North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F.
Supp. 451 (M.D.N.C. 1976); In re Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 221 S.E.2d 307 (1976).
Although the district court in North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children upheld the
bulk of a eugenic sterilization statute, it struck down as "arbitrary and capricious" a
section granting the retarded person's next-of-kin or legal guardian an absolute right to
demand sterilization. North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children, 420 F. Supp. at 455-
56.
57 A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND Dos-
SIERS 3 (1971).
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plained, many Americans now are subjects of "womb-to-tomb"
dossiers.58
Several plaintiffs have challenged the constitutionality of comput-
erized data banks. One such controversy reached the Supreme
Court in Whalen v. Roe.59 The disputed statute in that case re-
quired physicians to report to the state health department the
names and addresses of all patients receiving certain potentially ad-
dictive prescription drugs. The health department recorded this in-
formation in a centralized computer file. The plaintiffs in Whalen,
both patients and physicians, claimed this scheme "invade[d] a con-
stitutionally protected 'zone of privacy.' "'
The Supreme Court upheld the statute, stressing that the state
had erected substantial barriers to insure the confidentiality of the
computerized data and that the program might be useful in prevent-
ing drug abuse. Under different circumstances, however, the Court
acknowledged that a constitutional right of privacy might restrict
the government's ability to collect, store, or disclose private infor-
mation about its citizens. The Court noted its awareness "of the
threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of
personal information in computerized data banks or other massive
government files."'" For this reason, the Constitution might pro-
tect an "individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters. "62
Several lower courts have joined the Supreme Court in recogniz-
ing that, under some circumstances, computerized data banks may
violate a constitutional privacy interest. In Schulman v. New York
City Health & Hospitals Corp. ,63 the New York Court of Appeals
registered its sensitivity "to the dangers posed by modern computer
technology."' "Present day computerized information storage and
retrieval systems," the court observed, "may pose a significant
threat to the constitutionally protected right to privacy. "65
Although the court approved the computerized health department
files challenged in that case, it stressed both the narrowly tailored
58 Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights: Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1971) (statement of Arthur Miller).
59 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
60 Id. at 598.
61 Id. at 605.
6 2 Id. at 599.
63 38 N.Y.2d 234, 342 N.E.2d 501, 379 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1975).
64 Id. at 244, 342 N.E.2d at 507, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 709.
65 Id.
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objectives of the program and the health department's careful provi-
sions for confidentiality.66 Without these features, the court sug-
gested, government's collection and maintenance of sensitive
medical information might run afoul of the constitutional right of
privacy.
Similarly, in Peninsula Counseling Center v. Rahm,67 the Wash-
ington Supreme Court acknowledged that the government may
compile private medical information in computerized data banks
only if the government's program is "carefully tailored to meet a
valid governmental interest" and the intrusion is no "greater than is
reasonably necessary" to meet that interest.68 Any "more intrusive
disclosures to government authorities [would violate] the constitu-
tional right to privacy."69
The Rahm court, like the courts in Whalen and Schulman, ulti-
mately upheld the computerized data system challenged in that
case. 70 To date, no court has enjoined operation of a computerized
government data bank on the grounds that the data bank violates a
constitutional right of privacy. Nevertheless, language in cases like
Whalen, Schulman, and Rahm suggests that courts are sensitive to
possible abuses of computer technology, and the Constitution does
limit government uses of computerized recordkeeping systems. 7'
Under appropriate circumstances, courts might well invalidate
computerized data banks operated in an intrusive manner.72
66 1d., 379 N.Y.S.2d at 710.
67 105 Wash. 2d 929, 719 P.2d 926 (1986) (en banc).
6 8 Id. at 935, 719 P.2d at 929.
69 Id.
70 As in Whalen and Schulman, the Rahm court stressed that the system was "care-
fully tailored to meet the State's legitimate, and laudable, interests" and that "only a
handful of [government] officials [would] have access to the raw data." Id. at 936, 719
P.2d at 929. Indeed, the court compared the confidentiality of the medical data in
Rahm to the confidentiality of grand jury proceedings. Id., 719 P.2d at 930.
71 See also California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 78-79 (1974) (Powell, J.,
joined by Blackmun, J., concurring) (agreeing with Court's decision to uphold regula-
tions requiring banks to report details of transactions exceeding $ 10,000, but noting that
"[a] significant extension of the regulations' reporting requirements . . . would pose
substantial and difficult constitutional questions" because "[a]t some point, governmen-
tal intrusion upon [financial transactions] would implicate legitimate expectations of
privacy").
72 Dissenting justices in both Schulman and Rahm believed that the constitutional
limits had been exceeded in those cases. In Schulman, Justices Fuchsberg, Wachtler,
and Cooke argued that the centralized abortion records maintained in that case deterred
women from obtaining abortions and that the city could have achieved its ends by com-
piling statistics without recording the names of individual patients. Schulman v. New
York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 234, 245-49, 342 N.E.2d 501, 507-10, 379
N.Y.S.2d 702, 710-14 (1975) (Wachtler, J., joined by Cooke, J., dissenting); 38 N.Y.2d
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D. Life-Prolonging Medical Technologies
In 1975, the plight of twenty-one-year old Karen Ann Quinlan
captured the attention of the nation. After her lungs stopped
breathing for two fifteen-minute periods, Quinlan lapsed into a per-
manent vegetative coma. Doctors were able to keep Quinlan alive
by connecting her to an artificial respirator. Medical technology,
however, could not restore Karen Quinlan's brain or revive her
from the deep coma into which she had slipped. Neurologists pre-
dicted that Quinlan might live for some time with the help of a
mechanical respirator, but that she would never emerge from her
comatose state.73
After much deliberation, Quinlan's father asked the doctors to
disconnect the respirator and allow his daughter to die. The doc-
tors refused this relief, pointing out that Quinlan was still alive and
that removal of the respirator "would not conform to medical prac-
tices, standards and traditions." '74 Quinlan's father then sought ju-
dicial permission to disconnect the respirator.
In a landmark decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that
Karen Quinlan had a constitutional right to decline treatment with
the respirator, and her father could assert this right on her behalf.
The court acknowledged that the Constitution does not explicitly
mention a right of privacy that would protect patients from intru-
sive and unwanted medical procedures. Nonetheless, the court
found that "Supreme Court decisions have recognized.., a right of
personal privacy" and that "this right [was] broad enough to en-
compass a patient's decision to decline medical treatment under cer-
tain circumstances.
75
Numerous state and federal courts followed Quinlan in recogniz-
ing a constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining medical treat-
ment.76  These decisions permitted patients to reject respirators,
at 249-57, 342 N.E.2d at 510-15, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 714-21 (Fuchsberg, J., joined by
Cooke, J., dissenting). Likewise, Justices Pearson and Brachtenbach contended in
Rahm that the state could have met its goals by using anonymous computer codes,
rather than identifiable names, to compile data about mental health patients. Peninsula
Counseling Center, 105 Wash. 2d at 937-49, 719 P.2d at 930-36 (Pearson, J., joined by
Brachtenbach, J., dissenting).
73 See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 23-26, 355 A.2d 647, 653-56, cert. denied, 429 U.S.
922 (1976).
74 Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 19, 355 A.2d at 655.
75 d. at 39-40, 355 A.2d at 663.
7 6 See, e.g., Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988), attorney's fees awarded,
709 F. Supp. 325 (D.R.I. 1989); Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674
(1987) (en banc); Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 190, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220
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feeding tubes, and other forms of medical treatment.77 Moreover,
most courts permit guardians or family members to assert the con-
stitutional right of privacy on behalf of incompetent patients. As in
Quinlan, courts recognize that the right would be meaningless for
most patients if it could not be exercised by third parties.78
Gray v. Romeo,79 a recent decision by the District Court of
Rhode Island, is typical of these decisions. Marcia Gray, a forty-
nine-year-old woman, suffered a cerebral hemorrhage that left her
(1984); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 482 A.2d 713
(1984); Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Superintendent of Belchertown
State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); Leach v. Akron Gen.
Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980); In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d
545, 747 P.2d 445 (1987), amended, 757 P.2d 534 (1988) (correcting list of concurring
justices); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983) (en banc), modified on
other grounds, In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984) (en banc). Some
of these decisions rely solely upon the federal Constitution; others buttress their conclu-
sions with references to state constitutions or common law.
77 Bartling, Foody, Satz, Leach, and Colyer, discussed supra note 76, involved
mechanical respirators. In Gray, discussed supra note 76, the court authorized removal
of a surgically implanted feeding tube. Superintendent of Belchertown State School, dis-
cussed supra note 76, approved withholding chemotherapy from a mentally retarded
adult, and Rasmussen, discussed supra note 76, endorsed placement of "do not resusci-
tate" and "do not hospitalize" orders on an incompetent patient's chart. In Grant, the
court issued a broad order authorizing a guardian " 'to approve and direct the with-
holding of life sustaining procedures utilizing mechanical or other artificial means in-
cluding cardiopulmonary resuscitation, defibrilation, the use of a respirator, intubation,
the insertion of a naso-gastric tube, and intravenous nutrition and hydration.' " 109
Wash. 2d at 547, 747 P.2d at 446 (quoting an order issued following oral argument).
To the lay person, feeding tubes may not seem to share the technological sophistica-
tion of mechanical respirators or other medical devices. However, as the New Jersey
Supreme Court noted, "artificial feedings such as nasogastric tubes, gastrostomies, and
intravenous infusions are significantly different from bottle-feeding or spoonfeeding-
they are medical procedures with inherent risks and possible side effects, instituted by
skilled healthcare providers." In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 372, 486 A.2d 1209, 1236
(1985). According to another court, " '[e]fficient provision of nutrition with any of
these procedures requires skilled personnel and specialized techniques, often as special
nutrition support teams in hospitals. The standards required are quite exacting, and
substantial deviation from them greatly increases risks of infection or illness arising
from erroneous nutritional balance.' " In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 954 n.7 (Me. 1987)
(quoting Major, The Medical Procedures for Providing Food and Water., Indications and
Effects, reprinted in BY No EXTRAORDINARY MEANS: THE CHOICE TO FOREGO LIFE-
SUSTAINING FOOD AND WATER 21, 27 (J. Lynn ed. 1986)).
78See, e.g., Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 218-19, 741 P.2d at 685-86; Foody, 482 A.2d at
718 ("To deny the exercise because the patient is unconscious or incompetent would be
to deny the right."); Superintendent of Belchertown, 373 Mass. at 745, 370 N.E.2d at
427-28; Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664 ("The only practical way to prevent
destruction of the right is to permit the guardian and family of Karen to render their
best judgment . . . as to whether she would exercise it in these circumstances.").
79 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988), attorney's fees awarded, 709 F. Supp. 325 (D.R.I.
1989).
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in a persistent vegetative state.8 ' Gray's doctors agreed that her
chances of regaining consciousness were " 'close to zero.' "s Be-
cause Gray could not feed herself, surgeons inserted a tube in her
abdomen through which she received water and liquid nutrition.
Convinced that Marcia Gray would not want to be kept alive by
these means, her family asked the hospital to remove the feeding
tube. Hospital personnel unanimously refused this request, main-
taining that withdrawal of the feeding tube would be "tantamount
to euthanasia." The medical staff further objected that removal of
the tube would be "inconsistent with the physician's role as
safekeeper of his or her patient's well being."8 2
Like Quinlan's father, Gray's husband then sought judicial per-
mission to remove the feeding tube. The federal district court rec-
ognized a "right ... to control fundamental medical decisions" that
was "properly grounded in the liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause." 3 Because Marcia Gray was in-
competent, the court reasoned that her husband and family could
assert this constitutional right on her behalf.8 4 The hospital either
had to transfer Gray to a facility that would comply with her
wishes, or remove the tube itself.8 5
Not all courts, however, embrace the constitutional right to re-
fuse life-sustaining medical treatment. Several courts have vindi-
cated a patient's right to decline unwanted medical procedures, but
have rested those decisions on common law, rather than constitu-
80 According to the guardian appointed to represent Gray, a persistent vegetative
state "is a type of comatose state in which the cerebral functioning has ceased but in
which the brain stem functioning is fully or partially intact." Id. at 582. "The cere-
brum ... controls sensation and voluntary and conscious activities," so that a patient in
a persistent vegetative state "displays no voluntary or conscious movements, ...[or]
any awareness or sensation." Id. On the other hand, "[t]he brain stem controls primi-
tive reflexes, including heart activity, breathing, the sleep/wake cycle, reflexive activity
in upper and lower extremities, some swallowing motions and eye movements." Id.
Therefore, patients in a persistent vegetative state ordinarily display these reflexive ac-
tions. A persistent vegetative state "is generally a permanent condition." Id.
81 Id. at 583.
82 Id. The hospital also cited its "fear ... of civil or criminal responsibility" and its
"reputation ... [as] an institution for long-term care and the treatment of chronic care
patients." Id.
83 Id. at 585.
84 The court in Gray found it unnecessary to outline universal procedures for making
this type of judgment because Gray's husband, her family, the court-appointed guard-
ian, and the court itself all agreed that Gray clearly would have wanted withdrawal of
the feeding tube. Id. at 587-88.
85 1d. at 591.
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tional, grounds. In In re Storar,8 6 the New York Court of Appeals
noted that the existence of a constitutional right to decline medical
treatment was "a disputed question ... which the Supreme Court
has repeatedly declined to consider.""7 The court found it unneces-
sary to address that issue because "[a]t common law .... every per-
son 'of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body.' "88
More significantly, the Missouri Supreme Court recently refused
to allow family members to order removal of a feeding tube under
circumstances quite similar to those in Gray. In Cruzan v. Har-
mon, 89 the parents of a thirty-year-old woman who had languished
for five years in a vegetative state sought permission to remove her
surgically implanted feeding tube. The Missouri Supreme Court
observed that the United States Supreme Court had not endorsed a
constitutional right to refuse medical treatment and had repeatedly
warned against expansive readings of its privacy opinions. 90 Thus,
the state court expressed "grave doubts as to the applicability of
privacy rights to decisions to terminate the provision of food and
water to an incompetent patient."'" Even if such a right existed, it
was outweighed by the state's interest in prolonging the incompe-
tent patient's life. 92
86 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858
(1981).
87 1d. at 376, 420 N.E.2d at 70, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 272-73.
88 Id., 438 N.Y.S.2d at 272 (quoting Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211
N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914)); see also In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me.
1987). The New Jersey Supreme Court, which pioneered the constitutional right to
decline medical treatment in Quinlan, subsequently decided to base that right on the
common law rather than the Constitution. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 348, 486
A.2d 1209, 1223 (1985).
89 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Cruzan v. Director,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
90 Id. at 418. In support, the court cited both Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973)
("[lit is not clear to us that the claim asserted by some amici that one has an unlimited
right to do with one's body as one pleases bears a close relationship to the right of
privacy previously articulated in the Court's decisions."), and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 195 (1986) ("There should be ... great resistance to expand the substantive
reach of [the due process] Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the category of
rights deemed to be fundamental.").
91 760 S.W.2d at 418.
92 Id. at 424. In reaching this decision, the court stressed that the patient had neither
executed a formal living will nor made statements that would provide "clear and con-
vincing, inherently reliable evidence" of her opposition to the use of feeding tubes. Id.
at 425. Thus, the court did "not decide any issue ... relating to the authority of compe-
tent persons to suspend life-sustaining treatment in the face of terminal illness or other-
wise." Id. at 424.
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The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in
Cruzan.93 The Court may soon decide whether the Constitution
confers a right to refuse life-sustaining medical procedures and, if
so, whether a guardian may assert that right on behalf of an incom-
petent patient. Whatever the disposition of Cruzan, the lower court
opinions in Quinlan and its progeny display the difficulties courts
have faced in adapting our eighteenth century Constitution to twen-
tieth century technologies.
II
EXPLORING THE INTERFACE BETWEEN TECHNOLOGY
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
As the four case studies demonstrate, courts have played a signifi-
cant role in policing the social uses of new technologies. From
smallpox vaccines to feeding tubes, judges have probed the constitu-
tional ramifications of technological advances. The remainder of
this Article analyzes four significant trends that have emerged from
judicial confrontations between the Constitution and new
technologies.
A. The Growth of Judicial Cautiousness Toward Technology
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, most
courts greeted technological change with enthusiasm and rejected
constitutional challenges to those technologies. For example,
judges eagerly welcomed vaccination as a scientifically proven pre-
ventive of smallpox. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court observed
that "[i]n the present state of medical knowledge and public opinion
... it would be impossible for a court to deny that there is reason
for believing in the importance of vaccination as a means of protec-
tion from the scourge of smallpox."94 Likewise, the California
Supreme Court hailed vaccination as "the best method known to
medical science to lessen the liability to infection with the
disease."95
The courts also hastened to point out the social benefits flowing
93 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
94 Duffield v. School Dist., 162 Pa. 476, 483-84, 29 A. 742, 742-43 (1894).
95 Abeel v. Clark, 84 Cal. 226, 230, 24 P. 383, 384 (1890). Courts acknowledged that
some doctors and lay people opposed vaccination, see supra notes I I & 16 and accompa-
nying text, but they contemptuously dismissed this opposition. "There are those ...
who deny the efficacy of vaccination," one court commented, "as there are always some
who will deny any other result of human experience, however well established." State
v. Hay, 126 N.C. 999, 1002, 35 S.E. 459, 461 (1900).
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from universal vaccination. In 1830, the Vermont Supreme Court
noted that inoculation against smallpox had "eminent utility ... in
saving expense."' 96 The court reasoned that if a community vacci-
nated all of its members, individuals could "attend to their usual
vocations, instead of being confined with a loathsome disease, or
becoming nurses to those who are thus confined." 97 Seventy years
later, the North Carolina Supreme Court agreed that, without uni-
versal vaccination, smallpox would "quickly paralyze commerce
and all public business."9 Courts thus perceived vaccination as a
medical triumph allied with economic and social progress. 99
Similarly, many courts welcomed eugenic sterilization as a
proven scientific principle with beneficial social consequences. One
court declared: " 'There appears to be a wonderful unanimity of
favoring opinion as to the advisability of the sterilization of
criminals and the prevention of their further propagation. The
Journal of the American Medical Association recommends it, as
does the Chicago Physicians' Club, the Southern District Medical
Society, and the Chicago Society of Social Hygiene.' "i Another
court observed more simply: "Biological science has definitely
demonstrated that feeble-mindedness is hereditary." ''
Some judges and politicians believed that these eugenic principles
could save society from pressing ills. One court noted that the legis-
lature had enacted a eugenic sterilization statute in response to "the
growing belief that, due to the alarming increase in the number of
degenerates, criminals, feeble-minded, and insane, our race is facing
96 Hazen v. Strong, 2 Vt. 427, 432 (1830).
97 Id.
98Hay, 126 N.C. at 1001, 35 S.E. at 461.
99 The author of an influential treatise published during this era even more explicitly
linked universal vaccination with social and economic progress. He noted that during
the fourteenth century the Black Death killed half the laboring population in England.
As a result of this tragedy, "wages were greatly raised, [and] . . . the profits to be
obtained from the land were decreased .... [T]he workmen refused to work unless they
were given such pay as they might demand, and many fertile estates were ruined." H.
HEMENWAY, LEGAL PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC HEALTH ADMINISTRATION § 1, at 2
(1914). Hemenway suggested that modern capitalist societies could avoid such calami-
ties only if they embraced vaccination and other new techniques of controlling public
health. Id.
100 State v. Feilen, 70 Wash. 65, 69, 126 P. 75, 77 (1912) (quoting Foster, Hereditary
Criminality and Its Certain Cure, 22 Pearson's Magazine 565, 571 (1909)).
101 Smith v. Command, 231 Mich. 409, 414, 204 N.W. 140, 141 (1925); see also State
v. Troutman, 50 Idaho 673, 679, 299 P. 668, 670 (1931) ("The record before us and the
recognized authorities on the scientific questions involved leave no doubt in our minds
that heredity plays a controlling part in the blight of feeble-mindedness.").
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the greatest peril of all time."1 °2 Eight members of the United
States Supreme Court agreed that eugenic sterilization was neces-
sary "in order to prevent our being swamped with incompe-
tence."' 3 The California Attorney General was so enthusiastic
about the sterilization of prisoners and hospital inmates that he
rejoiced ovpr "this enlightened piece of legislation which is an
awakening note to a new era.""
Thus, a belief in the infallibility of science and an enthusiasm for
its social benefits helped courts reject constitutional challenges to
technological innovations during the opening decades of the twenti-
eth century. After about 1940, however, courts became more suspi-
cious of scientific claims and more wary of social programs
premised on those claims. In Skinner v. Oklahoma, l0 5 the Supreme
Court refused to endorse sterilization with the same enthusiasm it
had displayed only fifteen years earlier. Instead, the Court stressed
the dangers of eugenic sterilization:
The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reach-
ing and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause
races or types which are inimical to the dominant group to
wither and disappear. There is no redemption for the individual
whom the law touches. Any experiment which the State con-
102Smith, 231 Mich. at 425, 204 N.W. at 145. In its next sentence, the court dis-
claimed any power to say "[w]hether this belief was well founded." Id. Nevertheless,
the court affirmed that feeble-mindedness "present[ed] a social and economic problem
of grave importance" and that "no one [would] question" that the feeble-minded
"[were] a serious menace to society." Id. at 415, 204 N.W. at 142.
103 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). Justice Holmes, writing for the Court,
continued: "It is better for all the world if instead of waiting to execute degenerate
offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those
who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind." Id. Holmes further endorsed
eugenics in his nonjudicial writings. In one 1915 article, Holmes declared that "whole-
sale social regeneration" could be achieved only "by taking in hand life and trying to
build a race." This principle, he explained, "would be [his] starting point for an ideal
for the law." Holmes, Ideals and Doubts, 10 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1915); see also State
ex rel. Smith v. Schaffer, 126 Kan. 607, 608, 270 P. 604, 605 (1928) ("Procreation of
defective and feeble-minded children with criminal tendencies does not advantage, but
patently disadvantages, the race .... The race may insure its own perpetuation and
such progeny may be prevented in the interest of the higher general welfare.").
'o4 See Osborn v. Thomson, 103 Misc. 23, 36, 169 N.Y.S. 638, 645 (quoting the attor-
ney general's opinion), aff'd, 185 A.D. 902, 171 N.Y.S. 1094 (1918). However, the
court in Osborn, which was one of the few early decisions holding eugenic sterilization
unconstitutional, disagreed with the attorney general's "poetic" statement. Id.
Robert Cynkar has suggested that Americans embraced eugenic legislation during the
early decades of the twentieth century because they perceived eugenics as one means of
coping with the cultural cross currents sweeping society at that time. Cynkar, supra
note 33, at 1425-28.
105 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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ducts is to his irreparable injury. He is forever deprived of a
basic liberty. 106
Justice Jackson, concurring in the judgment, declared even more
emphatically that transmissibility of criminal characteristics "in our
present state of knowledge [is] uncertain," and that "[t]here are lim-
its to the extent to which a legislatively represented majority may
conduct biological experiments at the expense of the dignity and
personality and natural powers of a minority."' 7
More modern courts have continued to view eugenic sterilization
with skepticism. In 1981, the New Jersey Supreme Court admon-
ished lawmakers of a previous generation for being "too quick to
accept unproven scientific theories of eugenics.""' 8 The court de-
clared that "we have serious doubts about the scientific validity of
eugenic sterilization,... as well as its morality."' 1 9 Another court
recently pointed out that "[m]ost competent geneticists now reject
social Darwinism" and that "medical and genetical experts are no
longer sold on sterilization to benefit either retarded patients or the
future of the Republic." "o This decline in judicial respect for eu-
genic sterilization surely has contributed to the technology's consti-
tutional demise.
Similarly, modern judges have displayed a cautious attitude to-
ward the widespread governmental use of computerized data banks.
In Whalen v. Roe,"' the Supreme Court recognized "the threat to
privacy [which is] implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of
personal information in computerized data banks.""'  The Court
then cited the works of two authors who had campaigned vigor-
ously against the indiscriminate use of computerized data banks.I3
1
0 6 Id. at 541.
107 Id. at 546 (Jackson, J., concurring).
1081n re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 246, 426 A.2d 467, 472 (1981) (footnote omitted).
109 Id. at 246-47, 426 A.2d at 472-73 (footnote and citation omitted).
110 North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp. 451,
454 (M.D.N.C. 1976).
111 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
'1
2 Id. at 605. Justice Brennan, concurring in the judgment, recognized even more
emphatically that "[t]he central storage and easy accessibility of computerized data
vastly increase the potential for abuse of that information." Id. at 607. "[Future devel-
opments," he suggested, might therefore "demonstrate the necessity of some curb on
[computer] technology." Id.
1131d. at n.34 (citing A. MILLER, supra note 57; Boyer, Computerized Medical
Records and the Right to Privacy: The Emerging Federal Response, 25 BUFFALO L.
REV. 37 (1975); Miller, Computers, Data Banks and Individual Privacy.- An Overview, 4
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (1972)). Professor Miller, for example, warned:
(T]he computer, with its insatiable appetite for information, its image of infal-
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In another decision, Justice Douglas pessimistically forecast that
computers would enable government officials to record the con-
sumer purchases, telephone conversations, and financial transac-
tions of all citizens: "Now that we have the data banks, these...
items will enrich that storehouse and make it possible for a bureau-
crat-by pushing one button-to get in an instant the names of the
190 million Americans who are subversives or potential and likely
candidates."" 4 At least four other Justices shared Douglas's con-
cern that governmental recordkeeping might become so intrusive
that it "would implicate legitimate expectations of privacy.""' 5
On the New York Court of Appeals, Justice Fuchsberg similarly
observed that "[p]eople ... are ... divided over and mistrustful of
the potential of computers in government.""I16 Fuchsberg cautioned
that "[h]eadlines in the recent past, and even in the present, provide
ample basis for concern that centralized data banks may be mis-
used."'  Two Justices of the Washington Supreme Court con-
curred that "[c]omputers . . . permit the analysis and centralized
storage of each individual's record, in effect creating a 'dossier' on
practically every individual in the United States."" 8 These Justices
warned that authorizing the continued collection of this data would
libility, and its inability to forget anything that has been stored in it, may
become the heart of a surveillance system that will turn society into a trans-
parent world in which our homes, our finances, and our associations will be
bared to a wide range of casual observers, including the morbidly curious and
the maliciously or commercially intrusive.
A. MILLER, supra, at 3.
114 California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 85 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
115 Id. at 79 (Powell, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring); see also id. at 91 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting); id. at 93 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
116 Schulman v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 234, 256, 342
N.E.2d 501, 515, 379 N.Y.S.2d 702, 721 (1975) (Fuchsberg, J., joined by Cooke, J.,
dissenting).
117 Id. The majority in Schulman agreed that "(p]resent day computerized informa-
tion storage and retrieval systems may pose a significant threat to the constitutionally
protected right to privacy" and that the court was "not insensitive to the dangers posed
by modern computer technology." Id. at 244, 342 N.E.2d at 507, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 709.
118 Peninsula Counseling Center v. Rahm, 105 Wash. 2d 929, 938, 719 P.2d 926, 930
(1986) (Pearson, J., joined by Brachtenbach, J., dissenting). The justices analogized the
computer dossiers compiled in the United States to the intrusive recordkeeping of the
Soviet Union described in Solzhenitsyn's novel, CANCER WARD. Id. (" 'As every man
goes through life he fills in a number of forms for the record, each containing a number
of questions .... There are thus hundreds of little threads radiating from every man,
millions of threads in all.'" (quoting A. SOLZHENITSYN, CANCER WARD 189 (1968)).
The justices concluded that "[c]omputers [are] the machines from which these threads
emanate." Id.
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"move this country that much closer to the Orwellian society we all
fear.""
, 19
These references to computerized "dossiers" and an "Orwellian
society" suggest that judges view the effects of computer technology
with mixed feelings. Although computers permit efficient record-
keeping and rapid data analysis, they also reduce privacy and
threaten governmental abuse. One state court justice observed that
" '[t]he mere collection and retention of sensitive or personal infor-
mation creates a state of severe psychological insecurity.' "120 The
courts' recognition of the dark side of computer technology has
made them approach computerized recordkeeping with caution.
Although judges have upheld several applications of computer tech-
nology, they have suggested that other uses might violate a constitu-
tional right of privacy. This selectivity differs markedly from the
courts' broad endorsement of vaccination and sterilization during
an earlier era.
Finally, courts reviewing challenges to life-prolonging medical
technologies have been especially cognizant of the evils implicit in
those technologies. "Medical technology," one court wrote, "has
effectively created a twilight zone of suspended animation where
death commences while life, in some form, continues. Some pa-
tients ... want no part of a life sustained only by medical technol-
ogy."'' Another court more graphically described " '[t]he ultimate
horror [not of] death but the possibility of being maintained in
limbo, in a sterile room, by machines controlled by strangers.' "22
These courts fervently conclude that, at some point, "active [medi-
cal] treatment designed to prolong life becomes utterly pointless
and probably cruel."123
119 Id. at 948, 719 P.2d at 936.
120 Id. at 938, 719 P.2d at 930-31 (Pearson, J., joined by Brachtenbach, J., dissenting)
(quoting Comment, The Privacy Act of 1974: An Overview and Critique, 1976 WASH.
U.L.Q. 667, 674).
121 Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 211, 741 P.2d 674, 678 (1987) (en banc).
122 In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 340 (Minn. 1984) (quoting Steel, The Right to Die:
New Options in California, 93 CHRISTIAN CENTURY (July-Dec. 1976)).
1231n re Conroy, 188 N.J. Super. 523, 528, 457 A.2d 1232, 1235, rev'd, 190 N.J.
Super. 453, 464 A.2d 303 (1983), rev'd, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); see also
Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1134, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 299 (1986)
(describing the "increased dehumanizing aspects .. .created by the insertion of a per-
manent tube through [the patient's] nose and into her stomach"); Satz v. Perlmutter,
362 So. 2d 160, 164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (mechanical respirator would "inflict[ ]
never ending physical torture on [the patient's] body until the inevitable, but artificially
suspended, moment of death"), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 737-38, 370 N.E.2d 417, 423
OREGON LAW REVIEW
Because of judicial distaste for these intrusive procedures, courts
have approved the withdrawal of medical technologies even over
the determined opposition of doctors and nurses. In the pathbreak-
ing Quinlan case, the physicians treating Karen Quinlan refused to
disconnect the respirator sustaining her life.' 24 Nonetheless, the
court permitted Quinlan's father to order removal of the respirator.
Although the court admitted that it had "no inherent medical ex-
pertise," it believed that it was capable of "reevaluat[ing] the appli-
cability of the medical standards" and deciding whether they
contained sufficient "internal consistency and rationality" to bar the
relief sought for Karen Quinlan.' 25 Rather than deferring to medi-
cal judgment, the court examined the doctors' judgment critically
and rejected the prevailing medical standards.' 2 6
The same wariness of medical judgment emerges in the refusal of
some courts to allow medical jargon to dictate the results in right-
to-die cases. In Cruzan, the Missouri Supreme Court admitted that
reliance upon medical terminology is attractive because " '[i]t
removes the responsibility for decisions that seem harsh when ex-
plained in plainer language.' "127 Nonetheless, the court "refuse[d]
(1977) ("[I]n many cases the effect of using extraordinary measures to prolong life is to
'only prolong suffering, isolate the family from their loved one at a time when they may
be close at hand or result in economic ruin for the family.") (quoting Lewis, Machine
Medicine and Its Relation to the Fatally Ill, 206 J. A.M.A. 387 (1968)); In re Conroy, 98
N.J. 321, 343, 486 A.2d 1209, 1220 (1985); id. at 398-99, 486 A.2d at 1250 (Handler, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Eventually, pervasive bodily intrusions,
even for the best motives, will arouse feelings akin to humiliation and mortification for
the helpless patient.").
124 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
1 2 5 1In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 45, 355 A.2d 647, 666, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
1
26 See also Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297
(1986) (ordering public hospital to honor patient's demand to disconnect feeding tubes);
Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984) (trial court
should have ordered doctors to disconnect patient's respirator, even though both doc-
tors and hospital vigorously opposed disconnection as unethical); In re Conroy, 98 N.J.
321, 352-53, 486 A.2d 1209, 1225 (1985) ("[I]f the patient's right to informed consent is
to have any meaning at all, it must be accorded respect even when it conflicts with the
advice of the doctor or the values of the medical profession as a whole."). The courts'
willingness to overrule medical judgments in these cases contrasts with the deference
they show medical custom in malpractice cases. See W. KEETON, D. DoBBs, R. KEE-
TON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 189 (5th ed.
1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON] (standard of care in medical malpractice
cases is "one of 'good medical practice,' which is to say, what is customary and usual in
the profession").
127 Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 423 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (quoting Alexan-
der, Death by Directive, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 67, 83 (1988)), cert. granted sub
nora. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
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to succumb to the semantic dilemma created by medical determina-
tions" and held that the medical designation of a procedure as treat-
ment or non-treatment was irrelevant to the legal decision of
whether a guardian could order cessation of the procedure.' 28 Simi-
larly, in Gray v. Romeo,'2 9 the district court rejected the notion that
" 'the definition of a medical term of art should coincide with the
parameters of a constitutional standard.' "130 Refusing to distin-
guish between ordinary and extraordinary medical treatments, the
Gray court held that a guardian could refuse any type of treatment
that the incompetent patient would have declined.'
In the right-to-die cases, therefore, as in modern controversies
over eugenic sterilization and computerized data banks, the courts
have displayed an increasing caution towards technological ad-
vances and an unwillingness to allow scientific standards to dictate
social results. Although judges have recognized the benefits of com-
puterized recordkeeping, life-sustaining medical procedures, and
even eugenic sterilization,' 32 they have also seen the underside of
those technologies. No longer willing to accept a new technology
"just 'because it is there,' "' courts are more likely to probe the
social applications of scientific principles to insure that they confer
real benefits on individuals.
B. From Social Contract to Individual Rights
The judicial progression from universal vaccination to mechani-
cal respiration reveals not only an increased wariness of technologi-
cal change, but a marked shift in constitutional philosophy. In the
early vaccination and sterilization cases, courts centered their con-
stitutional doctrine on the belief that an implicit social contract gov-
erns society. According to this paradigm, individuals consent to
communal protection and then, having reaped the benefits of organ-
128 Id. at 423. Instead, the court ruled that the legal decision hinged on whether the
procedure was burdensome to the patient.
129 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988), attorney's fees awarded, 709 F. Supp. 325 (D.R.I.
1989).
130 Id. at 589 (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 764 n.8 (1985) (quoting Lee v.
Winston, 551 F. Supp. 247, 260 (E.D. Va. 1982))).
131 Id. Ironically, the courts' refusal to adopt medical technology led to opposite
results in Cruzan and Gray. In Gray, the court allowed removal of a feeding tube; in
Cruzan, it did not. See supra notes 79-85, 89-93 and accompanying text.
132 See, e.g., North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F.
Supp. 451, 454 (M.D.N.C. 1976); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 341 (Minn. 1984).
133 Schulman v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp. 38 N.Y.2d 234, 256, 342
N.E.2d 501, 515, 379 N.Y.S.2d 702, 721 (1975) (Fuchsberg, J., joined by Cooke, J.,
dissenting).
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ized society, must submit to its laws. More recent decisions eschew
this reliance on the notion of a social contract. Rather than
stressing social duties, these modern cases focus on individual
rights.
Jacobson v. Massachusetts,'34 in which the Supreme Court upheld
mandatory vaccination, exemplifies early judicial reliance upon the
concept of a social contract. The Court first noted that, under the
state constitution governing the citizen who had challenged univer-
sal vaccination, "the whole people covenants with each citizen, and
each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by
certain laws for 'the common good.' "135 The Court then stressed
that the individual resisting vaccination had "enjoy[ed] the general
protection afforded by an organized local government" for many
years and had "cho[sen] to remain a part of that population."' 36
Having accepted the benefits of civilized society, the citizen could
not avoid its obligations; vaccination against smallpox was merely
one term of the social contract.
The North Carolina Supreme Court likewise countered a consti-
tutional challenge to mandatory vaccination by observing that
" '[t]here is an implied assent on the part of every member of society
that his own individual welfare shall, in cases of necessity, yield to
that of the community.' ""' The court continued: "[I]t is every
day common sense that, if a people can draft or conscript its citi-
zens to defend its borders from invasion, it can protect itself from
the deadly pestilence that walketh by noonday."' 38
In the same case, Justice Douglas agreed with his colleagues that
"[w]hen man entered the social compact, he gave up a portion of his
natural liberty in exchange for the protection of society."' 39 Doug-
las, however, argued that there must be some limit to the terms of
that contract. 140 For example, Douglas asserted that the legislature
134 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
135 Id. at 27 (quoting MASS. CONST. preamble).
1
36 Id. at 37-38.
137 State v. Hay, 126 N.C. 999, 1001, 35 S.E. 459, 460 (1900) (quoting H. BROOM,
LEGAL MAXIMS 1 (7th ed. 1874) (1st ed. 1845)).
138 Id., 126 N.C. at 1001, 35 S.E. at 461; see also Morris v. City of Columbus, 102 Ga.
792, 798, 30 S.E. 850, 852 (1898) (" 'The individual must sacrifice his particular interest
or desires, if the sacrifice is a necessary one, in order that organized society as a whole
shall be benefited.' ") (quoting People ex rel. Nechamcus v. Warden of City Prison, 144
N.Y. 529, 39 N.E. 686 (1895)); id. at 801, 30 S.E. at 854 ("[T]he citizen may avoid the
consequences of a muncipal regulation by putting himself beyond the jurisdiction of the
municipality.").
139 Hay, 126 N.C. at 1006, 35 S.E. at 462 (Douglas, J., concurring).
140Id.
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-could not "pass an act that all persons afflicted with certain diseases
should be killed," and it could not "enforce vaccination if, under
the peculiar conditions of health of the patient, it might reasonably
be expected to endanger his life."'' Such laws, Douglas suggested,
would exceed the reasonable expectations of individuals consenting
to the social contract.
4 2
The United States Supreme Court concurred that, in some cases,
mandatory vaccination might transcend the implied terms of the
social contract. The Court acknowledged that vaccinating someone
who would suffer serious illness or death from vaccination "would
be cruel and inhuman in the last degree."' 43 Under those circum-
stances, the Court asserted, "the judiciary would ... be competent
to interfere and protect the health and life of the individual con-
cerned.""' Thus, the courts have relied upon the concept of a so-
cial contract both to uphold and limit mandatory vaccinations.' 45
The same references to an implicit social contract helped early
courts uphold statutes mandating eugenic sterilization. In Buck v.
Bell,'46 the Supreme Court peremptorily approved sterilization of a
mentally retarded woman by observing that "[w]e have seen more
than once that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens for
their lives."' 47 If the social contract could demand this sacrifice
from society's soldiers, "[i]t would be strange if it could not call
upon those who already sap the strength of the state for these lesser
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905).
1441d.
145 Courts have continued to use social contract terminology to resolve mandatory
vaccination disputes. In 1937, the New Hampshire Supreme Court observed that a
defendant challenging compulsory vaccination could not "claim constitutional rights
under articles 4 and 5 of the [New Hampshire] Bill of Rights without making conces-
sions of some of his natural rights under article 3." State v. Drew, 89 N.H. 54, 57-58,
192 A. 629, 632 (1937). The latter article contains explicit social contract imagery:
"When men enter into a state of society, they surrender up some of their natural rights
to that society, in order to ensure the protection of others; and, without such an
equivalent, the surrender is void." N.H. CONST. art. III.
Similarly, a New Jersey court noted in 1948 that cases sustaining mandatory vaccina-
tion " 'are but illustrations of the extent to which the highest tribunal has gone in vindi-
cation of the principle that the individual must yield somewhat of his personal rights to
society in return for the benefits of society which he enjoys.' " Sadlock v. Board of
Educ., 137 N.J.L. 85, 91, 58 A.2d 218, 222 (1948) (quoting Valentine v. Englewood, 76
N.J.L. 509, 522, 71 A. 344, 349 (1908)).
146 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
1
4 7 Id. at 207.
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sacrifices" of sterilization. "' The Court concluded that the same
"principle that sustain[ed] compulsory vaccination [was] broad
enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. '" '14 9
Other early decisions sustaining mandatory sterilization stress
that the individual's interest in reproduction must yield to the
greater social good. The Idaho Supreme Court, for example, de-
clared that "[i]f there be any natural right for natively mental defec-
tives to beget children, that right must give way to the police power
of the state in protecting the common welfare." 15 The Michigan
Supreme Court likewise queried: "Measured by its injurious effect
upon society, what right has any citizen or class of citizens to beget
children with an inherited tendency to crime, feeble-mindedness, id-
iocy, or imbecility?"' 
5
This notion of a social contract sometimes led to the opposite
result in sterilization cases. At least one state judge used the con-
cept of a social contract to oppose mandatory sterilization. Dissent-
ing from the Michigan Supreme Court decision quoted above,
Justice Wiest declared: "The inherent right of mankind to pass
through life without mutilation of organs or glands of generation
... was not lost or surrendered to legislative control in the creation
of government, and is beyond the reach of the governmental agency
known as the police power."'
152
Thus, during the early years of this century the courts employed
the image of a social contract both to uphold intrusive uses of new
technologies and to suggest some constitutional limits on those
technologies. 15 3 After 1940, these philosophical underpinnings of
constitutional law changed radically. Judges no longer referred to a
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 State v. Troutman, 50 Idaho 673, 679, 299 P. 668, 670 (1931).
151 Smith v. Command, 231 Mich. 409, 415, 204 N.W. 140, 142 (1925); see also State
ex rel. Smith v. Schaffer, 126 Kan. 607, 608, 270 P. 604, 605 (1928) ("Procreation of
defective and feeble-minded children with criminal tendencies does not advantage, but
patently disadvantages, the race. . . . The race may insure its own perpetuation and
such progeny may be prevented in the interest of the higher general welfare.").
152 Smith, 231 Mich. at 436, 204 N.W. at 149.
153 One of the most explicit connections between constitutional law and the idea of a
social contract appears in State v. Wordin, 56 Conn. 216, 14 A. 801 (1887), a case
upholding the constitutionality of an ordinance requiring physicians to report the names
of patients infected with communicable diseases. The Connecticut Supreme Court ob-
served there that the provisions of the fourteenth amendment "place no limitation upon
the power of the legislature ... other than that which would have been equally upon it
in their absence, namely, that it shall not violate the fundamental principles and pur-
poses of the social compact." Id. at 227, 14 A. at 803.
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social contract or to an individual's communal duties. Instead, con-
stitutional opinions began to focus on individual rights.' 54
The Supreme Court heralded this change in Skinner v.
Oklahoma .. by announcing that a challenge to eugenic steriliza-
tion "touche[d] a sensitive and important area of human rights."' 56
These opening words of Skinner sent a clear signal that the Court
had shifted the focal point of its analysis. Henceforth, the starting
point for constitutional decisions would be individual rights,'57 not
social duties. Indeed, Skinner contained no mention of the individ-
ual's duty to make sacrifices for the greater good.
The Supreme Court maintained this focus on individual rights
when it confronted challenges to computerized record keeping. In
Whalen v. Roe,' 58 the Court catalogued two types of privacy rights:
"the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters"
and "the interest in independence in making certain kinds of impor-
tant decisions."' 59 Although the Court ultimately found no viola-
tion of either right, it is significant that the Court began its analysis
154 1 have suggested elsewhere that the concept of a social contract retains some util-
ity today, especially in helping define the protections conferred by the equal protection
clause. See Merritt, Communicable Disease and Constitutional Law. Controlling AIDS,
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 739 (1986). So far, however, most modem courts have avoided
social contract analogies.
155 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
156 Id. at 536; see also id. at 541 ("We are dealing here with legislation which involves
one of the basic civil rights of man.").
157 Modern sterilization opinions continue to acknowledge that the right of procrea-
tion is fundamental, see North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina,
420 F. Supp. 451 (M.D.N.C. 1976); Motes v. Hall County Dep't of Family & Children
Servs., 251 Ga. 373, 306 S.E.2d 260 (1983). But cf In re Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 103, 221
S.E.2d 307, 312 (1976) ("The United States Supreme Court has also held that the wel-
fare of all citizens should take precedence over the rights of individuals to procreate."
(citing Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927))).
Recent challenges to mandatory vaccination also invoke a panoply of rights. For
example, in Brown v. City School Dist., 104 Misc. 2d 796, 429 N.Y.S.2d 355 (1980),
aff'd, 83 A.D.2d 755, 444 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1981), the trial court observed that "the free
exercise of religion is a fundamental right under the Constitution," and that the legisla-
ture had attempted to "preserve, whenever possible, a coexistence of public health pro-
tection and a recognition of the right of serious religious practice." Id. at 799-800, 429
N.Y.S.2d at 357. The court concluded that "governments have reason to consider
each concern as fundamental to the best welfare of their people." Id. at 800, 429
N.Y.S.2d at 357.
158 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
159 Id. at 599-600. The Court also referred to the doctors' "right to practice medicine
free of unwarranted state interference," although it concluded that this right was no
greater than the patients' privacy interests. Id. at 604; see also Peninsula Counseling
Center v. Rahm, 105 Wash. 2d 929, 933-34, 719 P.2d 926, 928 (1986) (en banc) ("These
privacy rights fall into two different categories. First, individuals should be allowed the
autonomy to make certain fundamental decisions without government intrusion ....
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by recognizing both rights. As Justice Stewart noted in his concur-
rence, the Court could have disposed of the case without acknowl-
edging any constitutional right to oppose computerized
recordkeeping. 60
The numerous cases reviewing the use of life-sustaining medical
technologies also center on the right of individuals to reject those
technologies. In one decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court de-
clared that "[t]he starting point in analyzing whether life-sustaining
treatment may be withheld or withdrawn from an incompetent pa-
tient is to determine what rights a competent patient has to accept
or reject medical care."'' The court recognized both a common
law right to control one's body and a federal constitutional right to
make those decisions. 162 Only after establishing both of those rights
did the court consider whether any societal interests might override
them. It concluded, moreover, that "the right to self-determination
ordinarily outweighs any countervailing state interests."'
163
One commentator has observed that this practice of "attributing
'rights' to [irreversibly comatose] patients is somewhat problem-
atic" because these patients can "make no decisions about how to
exercise any such rights."'" 6 Courts, however, continue to find a
"right of privacy, "165 a "right to be free of bodily invasion,"' 66 and
a "right of self-determination" 167 in cases involving the withdrawal
of life-prolonging medical treatment. These constant references to
rights underscore the extent to which courts tie their constitutional
philosophy to a taxonomy of individual rights.
Secondly, they should also be protected from disclosure of certain personal matters to
the government.").
160 429 U.S. at 609 (previous Court decisions do "not recognize a general interest in
freedom from disclosure of private information," and Whalen should not be read to
create such an interest).
161 In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 346, 486 A.2d 1209, 1221 (1985).
162 Id. at 348, 486 A.2d at 1222. Although the court recognized the existence of this
constitutional right, it subsequently rested its decision solely on common-law grounds.
Id., 486 A.2d at 1223.
163 Id. at 353, 486 A.2d at 1225.
164 L. TRIBE, supra note 54, § 15-11, at 1368 n.25.
165 See, e.g., Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 8-9, 426 N.E.2d
809, 814 (1980).
166 See, e.g., In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 553, 747 P.2d 445, 449 (1987), amended,
757 P.2d 534 (1988) (correcting list of concurring justices); see also Gray v. Romeo, 697
F. Supp. 580, 584 (D.R.I. 1988) ("right of an individual to control his or her own
body"); Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 216, 741 P.2d 674, 683 (1987) ("right to
be free from nonconsensual physical invasions").
167 Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 585; see also Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 164 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978) ("right to self-determine"), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
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This attachment to rights in medical treatment cases has
prompted courts to allow third parties to assert those rights on be-
half of incompetent patients. Courts reaching this result have
stressed that patients should not lose an important constitutional
right merely because they are unconscious or incompetent. As the
New Jersey Supreme Court recognized in Quinlan, if a decision to
reject life-sustaining medical treatment "is regarded as a valuable
incident of [the] right of privacy,... then it should not be discarded
solely on the basis that [the patient's] condition prevents her con-
scious exercise of the choice."' 68 Thus, the preoccupation with
rights has led to a paradoxical result: a comatose patient's right of
self-determination is assigned to third parties so the patient will not
lose that right.169 This position demonstrates the courts' commit-
ment to individual rights as the focal point of constitutional
analysis.
Thus, the doctrinal foundations of constitutional law have under-
gone a subtle, yet significant, shift during the last hundred years.
Although courts once stressed an implicit social contract setting
forth social duties, today they concentrate on individual rights. As
the following section demonstrates, this focus on individual rights
has prompted the expansion of constitutional doctrine in many
cases involving new technologies.
C The Creation of New Constitutional Doctrine
One of the most striking characteristics of cases pitting constitu-
tional law against technological change is the frequency with which
courts have used these cases to recognize novel constitutional prin-
ciples. Controversies over eugenic sterilization, computerized
databanks, and life-sustaining medical techniques have all contrib-
uted important new dimensions to constitutional law.'
In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 7' the Supreme Court radically re-
worked equal protection principles at the same time it reversed its
16 8 
In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
169 The Missouri Supreme Court denounced this position as "logically inconsistent"
in Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 425 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom.
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
170 Although early decisions involving mandatory vaccination did not create any new
constitutional principles, those cases did provide important crucibles for the refinement
of emerging constitutional doctrines. The courts, for example, repeatedly defined the
scope of the police power in vaccination cases and used those cases to articulate their
view of the social contract. See supra notes 135-45 and accompanying text.
171 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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position on eugenic sterilization. Before Skinner, the Court rou-
tinely rejected equal protection challenges, upholding legislation if
it could find any reasonable basis for the legislature's actions.' 7 2 In-
deed, in Buck v. Bell, the Court had denigrated equal protection
challenges as "the usual last resort of constitutional arguments."'7 3
In Skinner, however, the Court created a more searching form of
scrutiny for the "basic civil right" of procreation'7 4 and struck
down the offending legislation. Skinner thus pioneered the Court's
modern theory that statutes affecting fundamental rights require a
stricter form of equal protection scrutiny than the "rational basis"
review reserved for most legislation.' 7 5
The fundamental rights doctrine outlined in Skinner has proven
exceedingly fruitful. Since 1942, the Supreme Court has cited Skin-
ner more than eighty-five times.'7 6 The Court has relied on this
case to protect constitutional rights to marry, 177 to obtain contra-
ceptives, 178 to vote in state elections, 179 and to choose whether to
terminate a pregnancy. 80 Lower courts have found Skinner
equally instructive. The New Jersey courts, for example, recently
invoked Skinner to sketch competing constitutional rights of a sur-
rogate mother and her contractual partner."'8 Few cases have had
172 Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911); see also New York ex
rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 73-75 (1928) (citing cases).
173 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
174 316 U.S. at 541.
17 5 See generally 2 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 54, § 18.3.
Chief Justice Stone, concurring in Skinner, underscored the extent to which the case
departed from traditional equal protection analysis. Under longstanding equal protec-
tion doctrine, Stone reasoned, Oklahoma should have been able to apply its sterilization
remedy to any recognized class of felons. 316 U.S. at 543-44 (citing Keokee Coke Co. v.
Taylor, 234 U.S. 224, 227 (1914); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 144 (1914);
Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U.S. 260, 271 (1912)). In addition, Stone believed that the
Court's precedents compelled the Court to presume that the legislature, even in the
absence of concrete evidence, knew "that the criminal tendencies of some classes of
offenders [were] more likely to be transmitted than those of others." Id. at 544.
176 This count, drawn from SHEPARD'S UNITED STATES CITATIONS, includes cita-
tions found in majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. An even larger number of
citations appear in lower court opinions. 3 SHEPARD'S UNITED STATES CITATIONS 58-
60 (5th ed. 1984, Supp. 1984-1986, Supp. 1986-1988).
177 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-85 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
12 (1967).
178 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 545 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
179 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
18
0 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-153 (1973).
181 In the celebrated Baby "M" case, the trial court held that the sperm donor father
and surrogate mother had a fundamental right to execute a surrogate parenting agree-
ment. In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 385-88, 525 A.2d 1128, 1163-65 (1987), aff'd
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a more lasting impact on modern constitutional law than Skinner v.
Oklahoma.
The Supreme Court in Skinner did not simply use the Constitu-
tion to adjudicate a social controversy prompted by modern tech-
nology. In resolving that controversy, it modified equal protection
doctrine in a manner holding implications for a wide range of con-
stitutional cases. Similarly, the Supreme Court's consideration of
computerized data banks in Whalen v. Roe '8 2 led to the recognition
of a new constitutional "interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters."'8 3 As Justice Stewart recognized in his Whalen concur-
rence, this right was completely unprecedented. Previous Supreme
Court opinions had denied the existence of any "general constitu-
tional 'right to privacy' "s184 that might include a right to withhold
confidential information from government data banks. Whalen was
the first case to intimate that the constitutional right of privacy
might be this broad.
Like the fundamental rights doctrine established by Skinner, the
right of privacy recognized in Whalen has proven to be a vital force
in modern constitutional law. During the decade since the Supreme
Court decided Whalen, lower courts have recognized a right of pri-
vacy to restrain police departments from probing the private sexual
activities of their officers, 8 5 to restrict the ability of government
in part, rev'd in part, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988). The state's highest court
agreed that the sperm donor and surrogate mother had a fundamental constitutional
right to procreate. It held, however, that the father did not have a fundamental right to
custody when the mother opposed that claim. In re Baby M, 109 N.J. at 447-49, 537
A.2d at 1253-54. On the other hand, the state supreme court found that the surrogate
mother had a fundamental interest, derived in part from Skinner, to the companionship
of her child. Id. at 450, 537 A.2d at 1255. The court did not have to decide how far this
right might reach because it restored the surrogate mother's parental rights on noncon-
stitutional grounds. Id.
182 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
18 3 Id. at 599.
184 Id. at 607-08 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 350 (1967)); see also A. MILLER, supra note 57, at 200 (observing, several years
before Whalen, that constitutional privacy principles "were formulated before the ad-
vent of computer technology and need further judicial development before they can
meet the challenge presented by the new information systems"); Boyer, supra note 113,
at 89 (noting two years before Whalen, that the possibility of constitutional limits on
computerized recordkeeping "remains largely unrealized").
185 Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
979 (1984); Shuman v. City of Philadelphia, 470 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Pa. 1979); cf. Mc-
Kenna v. Fargo, 451 F. Supp. 1355 (D.N.J. 1978) (city's psychological testing of fire
fighters implicated the constitutional right of privacy, but survived strict scrutiny be-
cause the city had a compelling interest in protecting citizens from incompetent fire
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agencies to inspect private medical records,1 16 and to shield blood
banks from disclosing the names of donors who might have been
infected with the AIDS virus.187 Whalen's right of privacy, there-
fore, has affected cases far removed from the abuses of computer
technology.
Respirators, feeding tubes, and other medical technologies have
also prompted the creation of new constitutional doctrine. Quinlan
and other lower court decisions pioneered the concept of a constitu-
tional right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. Although
the Supreme Court recognizes a constitutional right of privacy, that
right has been limited to decisions respecting family life and procre-
ation.1 8 The Court, moreover, has cautioned lower courts and liti-
gants against reading this right of privacy too broadly. 89 Under
these circumstances, the creation of a constitutional right to refuse
lifesaving treatment was novel and controversial.' 90
fighters and could adopt regulations narrowly tailoring access to the testing data), aff'd,
601 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1979).
186 United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980); Hawaii
Psychiatric Soc'y v. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028 (D. Haw. 1979); Division of Medical
Quality v. Gherardini, 93 Cal. App. 3d 669, 156 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1979). Other courts
have recognized that unlimited governmental inspection of private medical records
would invade the constitutional right of privacy, but have found that the intrusions
before them were sufficiently justified by weighty governmental interests to withstand
constitutional scrutiny. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Director of the Nat'l Inst.
for Occupational Safety and Health, 636 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
877 (1981); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Finklea, 442 F. Supp. 821 (S.D. W. Va.
1977).
187 Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987); Doe v.
University of Cincinnati, 42 Ohio App. 3d 227, 538 N.E.2d 419 (1988); cf. Tarrant
County Hosp. Dist. v. Hughes, 734 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (recognizing that
disclosure of the names of blood donors implicates the constitutional right of privacy,
but holding that the need for disclosure and provisions for confidentiality outweighed
the donors' privacy interests).
188 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to choose abortion over childbirth); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to choose whether to use contraceptives).
189 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986) ("There should be . . .
great resistance to expand the substantive reach of [the due process] Clauses, particu-
larly if it requires redefining the category of rights deemed to be fundamental.").
190 Cf Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 418 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) ("Based on our
analysis of the right to privacy decisions of the Supreme Court, we carry grave doubts
as to the applicability of privacy rights to decisions to terminate the provision of food
and water to an incompetent patient."), cert. granted sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo.
Dep't of Health, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 376, 420 N.E.2d
64, 70, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 272-73 (the existence of a constitutional right to decline life-
saving treatment "is a disputed question . . . which the Supreme Court has repeatedly
declined to consider"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); see also People v. Privitera, 23
Cal. 3d 697, 702-03, 591 P.2d 919, 921-22, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431, 433-34 (en banc) (refus-
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Once again, this expansion of constitutional doctrine affected liti-
gants seeking remedies far different from the withdrawal of life-pro-
longing medical treatment. During the thirteen years since
Quinlan, courts have relied upon that decision to strike down re-
strictions on the practice of acupuncture,' 9' to recognize a right to
obtain laetrile for cancer treatment, t92 and, ironically, to hold that
parents have a constitutional right to seek sterilization of their re-
tarded children.' 93 The right of privacy recognized in Quinlan,
therefore, has grown into a broad constitutional right to control all
aspects of medical care.
The courts' willingness to inaugurate this right in cases involving
life-prolonging medical technologies is particularly remarkable be-
cause constitutional principles were unnecessary to resolve many of
these disputes. The imposition of medical treatment against a pa-
tient's wishes is common law battery, for which nominal, actual,
and even punitive damages are available.' 94 Most right-to-die cases,
therefore, could be analyzed as simple battery suits in which the
patient or a guardian acting on behalf of an incompetent patient
asserts that continued medical treatment would be tortious. 95 Un-
less the patient is confined in a public hospital, or the state man-
dates continued treatment, it is unnecessary for the courts to
address any constitutional issues.' 96 Indeed, in some cases the
ing to recognize a constitutional right to use laetrile as a treatment for cancer), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz,
373 Mass. 728, 736, 370 N.E.2d 417, 422 (1977) (patient's claim to reject life saving
medical technology "presents novel issues of fundamental importance that should not
be resolved by mechanical reliance on [existing] legal doctrine").
191 Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F. Supp. 1038, 1048-49 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
192 Rizzo v. United States, 432 F. Supp. 356, 358 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Suenram v. Soci-
ety of Valley Hosp., 155 N.J. Super. 593, 383 A.2d 143 (1977).
193 Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361, 370-71 (D. Conn. 1978).
194 See, e.g., Cathemer v. Hunter, 27 Ariz. App. 780, 558 P.2d 975 (1976); Rainer v.
Buena Community Memorial Hosp., 18 Cal. App. 3d 240, 95 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1971);
Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905); Hershley v. Brown, 655 S.W.2d
671, 676 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 126, § 18, at 117.
195 A few courts have analyzed right-to-die cases in this manner. See supra notes 86-
88 and accompanying text. The vast majority of courts, however, continue to rely ex-
clusively or partially on constitutional grounds.
196 Cf. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 427 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (Blackmar, J.,
dissenting) (constitutional issues are "of primary importance only if the case [is] gov-
erned by legislation"), cert. granted sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health,
109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989). Litigants may prefer to phrase their complaints in constitu-
tional terms because of the availability of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. See
Gray v. Romeo, 709 F. Supp. 325 (D.R.I. 1989) (awarding attorney's fees to a lawyer
who successfully represented a patient in a lawsuit to disconnect the patient's feeding
tube).
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courts have struggled to find sufficient state action to support a con-
stitutional right. "97
The right-to-die cases, therefore, provide an extreme example of
the courts' willingness to fashion novel constitutional principles in
controversies over new technologies. Even when constitutional ad-
judication might not have been necessary, the courts have expanded
constitutional doctrine to meet the challenges of modem technol-
ogy. As with eugenic sterilization and computerized recordkeeping,
the new constitutional principles recognized in right-to-die cases are
sure to invigorate other areas of constitutional law.
D. Emergence of a New Judicial Role
One hundred years ago, courts perceived technological change as
an inevitable and beneficial process. Judges confined their interac-
tion with technology to the passive endorsement of legislative initia-
tives or the systematic removal of constitutional barriers to those
initiatives. 198
These courts were willing to tolerate technological advances even
at the expense of individual rights. Indeed, some courts believed
that individual hardship was the regrettable, but unavoidable, by-
product of progress. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded "that
every forward step in the progress of the race is marked by an inter-
ference with individual liberties."' 99 With this chilling pronounce-
ment, the court upheld the constitutionality of a statute authorizing
the sterilization of mentally defective persons. 2°
During the last seventy-five years, however, courts have gradu-
1
9 7 See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 215 n.9, 741 P.2d 674, 682 n.9 (1987);
Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 461, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 540 (1980), modified on other
grounds sub nom. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 120-21, 660 P.2d 738, 742
(1983) (en banc), modifiedon other grounds, In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d
1372 (1984) (en banc). In these cases the courts premised state action on the state's
pervasive regulation of doctors and hospitals, the court's involvement in appointing a
guardian, the state's parenspatriae responsibility for incompetents, and the possibility of
criminal prosecution if the state wrongfully withheld medical treatment.
198 For examples of this complacent attitude, see Morris v. City of Columbus, 102
Ga. 792, 796, 30 S.E. 850, 852 (1898) ("With the wisdom or policy of vaccination, the
courts have nothing to do .... The legislature has seen fit to adopt the opinion of those
scientists who insist that it is efficacious, and this is conclusive upon us."); Duffield v.
School Dist. of Williamsport, 162 Pa. 476, 483, 29 A. 742, 742 (1894) ("Vaccination
may be or may not be a preventive of smallpox. That is a question about which medical
men differ, and which the law affords no means of determining in a summary
manner.").
199 Smith v. Command, 231 Mich. 409, 425, 204 N.W. 140, 145 (1925).
20o Id.
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ally adopted a more aggressive attitude toward technology. Today,
judges are not only willing to question the benefits of new technolo-
gies, but they are eager to assume an active role as mediators of the
conflicts between individual rights and technological gains.
This trend began in 1913, when the New Jersey Supreme Court
parted company with many of its sister courts and invalidated a
eugenic sterilization statute. The court struck down the statute on
the relatively narrow ground that it violated the equal protection
clause by authorizing the sterilization of some, but not all, epilep-
tics.2 ' The judges, however, did not confine themselves to a nar-
row discussion of this technical legal ground. Instead, the court
considered at length the ramifications of a governmental power to
sterilize undesirables. Under such a regime, the court noted, a legis-
lature might choose to sterilize individuals afflicted with tuberculo-
sis, syphilis, or other communicable diseases. The government
might even use such a power to mandate the extinction of unpopu-
lar racial groups or to limit population growth.2 °2 "Evidently the
large and underlying question," the court concluded, "is, How far is
government constitutionally justified in the theoretical betterment
of society by means of the surgical sterilization of certain of its
unoffending, but undesirable, members? ' 20 3 The court thus at-
tempted not only to adjudicate the controversy before it, but to
evaluate the broader implications of a new technology.
The United States Supreme Court adopted a similar attitude
when it invalidated a eugenic sterilization statute in Skinner v.
Oklahoma.2°4 The Court stated that "[t]he power to sterilize, if ex-
ercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects. In
evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types which are inimical
to the dominant group to wither and disappear."2 5 Like the New
Jersey Supreme Court before it, the Court thus reviewed some of
the social repercussions of eugenic sterilization.
This new judicial willingness to police the achievements of tech-
nology became even more marked when the courts considered the
constitutionality of computerized data banks. In Whalen v. Roe,
20 6
201 Smith v. Board of Examiners, 85 N.J.L. 46, 88 A. 963 (1913). The court's deci-
sion foreshadowed the United States Supreme Court's eventual decision in Skinner v.
Oklahoma. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
202 85 N.J.L. at 52-53, 88 A. at 966.
203 Id. at 53, 88 A. at 966.
204 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
20 5 Id. at 541.
206 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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the Supreme Court's sensitivity to the potential abuses of computer-
ized data banks produced the following observations:
The collection of taxes, the distribution of welfare and social se-
curity benefits, the supervision of public health, the direction of
our Armed Forces, and the enforcement of the criminal laws all
require the orderly preservation of great quantities of informa-
tion, much of which is personal in character and potentially em-
barrassing or harmful if disclosed.2 °7
The Court then suggested in dicta that, without some statutory as-
surance of confidentiality, maintenance of these massive data banks
might violate a constitutional right of privacy.2"8 Once again, the
Court used a particular controversy to explore the wider social im-
plications of a new technology and to suggest how society might
adapt to that technology.
Two lower court judges, confronting similar challenges to com-
puterized recordkeeping, more explicitly recognized that the courts
have a special role to play in regulating the tide of technological
innovations. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Pearson of the Wash-
ington Supreme Court expressed concern that when "[c]onfronted
with ever-advancing technological developments, we have resigned
ourselves to the inevitability of our private affairs appearing on
silicon micro-chips in computers too numerous to count. ' 20 9 Pear-
son entreated his colleagues that these "infringements upon privacy
cannot be accepted as an inevitable outgrowth of technological ad-
vancement. ' 2 10 The courts, "[a]s the final arbiter of [the] state's
constitution," should instead restrain technological developments
that might destroy personal privacy.2 1
Similarly, Justice Fuchsberg of the New York Court of Appeals
urged that, "cautious and careful step-by-step investigation
2 12
should accompany computerized technology. Fuchsberg warned
2 0 7 Id. at 605.
208 Id.
209 Peninsula Counseling Center v. Rahm, 105 Wash. 2d 929, 937, 719 P.2d 926, 930
(1986) (en banc).
2 10 Id. at 939, 719 P.2d at 931.
211 Id.; see also id. at 948, 719 P.2d at 936 (" 'It is not technology, as such, which
affects society for good or bad, but its uses, which are ... shaped by the values of society
and by the historical context in which the technology is used.... We must remember
that we are not trapped helplessly in front of an unstoppable technological steam-
roller.' ") (quoting Weingarten, Privacy: A Terminal Idea, 10 HuM. RTS. 18, 56
(1982))).
212 Schulman v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 234, 256, 342
N.E.2d 501, 515, 379 N.Y.S.2d 702, 721 (1975) (Fuchsberg, J., joined by Cooke, J.,
dissenting).
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that, although society should welcome computerized recordkeeping
when it "serves a vital and otherwise unattainable goal," technology
"ought not be used just 'because it is there.' "213 Instead, he sug-
gested that courts should vigorously enforce the constitutional right
to privacy and assume "an increasingly powerful and pervasive an-
tidotal role in keeping the potential abuses of electronic and other
scientific devices in check." '2 14
The right-to-die cases provide even clearer illustrations of the
courts' new role as social referees of technological advances. In the
Quinlan case, for example, the trial judge noted that society tradi-
tionally had placed responsibility for the "nature, extent and dura-
tion of [medical] care .. . in the hands of the physician."2 5 The
New Jersey Supreme Court rejected this allocation of responsibility.
Instead, the court concluded that decisions about patients like
Karen Quinlan "must ... be responsive not only to the concepts of
medicine but also to the common moral judgment of the commu-
nity at large. In the latter respect the Court has a nondelegable
judicial responsibility.
2 16
In subsequent cases, the New Jersey Supreme Court continued to
stress its unique judicial role in policing potential abuses of medical
technology. In 1985, the court observed that "[t]he courts, as
guardians of our personal rights, have a special responsibility to
place appropriate constraints on ... private decision-making [about
medical treatment] and to create guideposts that will help protect
people's interests in determining the course of their own lives."
21 7
213 Id.
2 14 Id., 379 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
2 15
In re Quinlan, 137 N.J. Super. 227, 259, 348 A.2d 801, 818 (Ch. Div. 1975),
modified and remanded, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
216In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 44, 355 A.2d 647, 665, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976). The Court continued: "Put in another way, the law, equity and justice must
not themselves quail and be helpless in the face of modem technological marvels
presenting questions hitherto unthought of." Id. The court then declared itself able to
"reevaluate the applicability of the medical standards," and overrule the medical deci-
sion-makers if their position was inconsistent with emerging social views. Id. at 45, 355
A.2d at 666.
217In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 345, 486 A.2d 1209, 1221 (1985); see also In re Storar,
52 N.Y.2d 363, 384, 420 N.E.2d 64, 74-75, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 276-77 (Jones, J., dissent-
ing in part):
There are ... abundant manifestations of both the breadth and depth of inter-
est and concern on the part of the medical profession, theologians, ethicists,
moralists, sociologists and criminologists, as well as of the public at large [in
the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical technology]. In this circumstance I
am persuaded that we have a special responsibility to express our views with
respect to judicial participation [on these issues] ....
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Two years later, Justice O'Hern justified this role by noting that
" '[l]aw is one of the basic means through which a society translates
its values into policies and applies them to human conduct.' "218
Since Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court has developed a
code of procedures and standards to govern the withdrawal of life-
supporting medical care under a variety of circumstances.2" 9 In
producing this canon, the court aggressively sought opportunities to
guide decisionmaking for incapacitated patients. Even when pa-
tients died before the court could render its decision, the justices
refused to dismiss the controversies as moot and used the cases to
inform future patients and their families of their rights. In In re
Farrell,220 for example, the court reviewed the petition of a deceased
patient to "formulate guidelines that might aid future patients, their
loved ones, and their physicians in dealing with similar situa-
tions."' 22' The court comprehensively surveyed the rights of compe-
tent patients to refuse life-saving medical treatment, addressing
such details as standards for determining competence, special pro-
tections for patients treated at home, and the need for judicial
review.22 2
Other courts have displayed the same willingness to specify the
2 18 In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 361, 529 A.2d 404, 417 (1987) (O'Hern, J., concur-
ring) (citing President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment 30
(1983)).
219 See In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987) (removal of treatment from
patient in a persistent vegetative state who failed to express her preferences before be-
coming incompetent); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987) (removal of treat-
ment from patient in a persistent vegetative state who had expressed her unwillingness
to be kept alive in such a state); In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987) (with-
drawal of treatment from competent patient); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209
(1985) (withdrawal of treatment from severely impaired, incompetent patient who was
not comatose).
220 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987).
221 Id. at 347, 529 A.2d at 410; see also id. at 353, 529 A.2d at 413 ("We heard this
case in order to help future patients like Mrs. Farrell, and their families and doctors
.... .).
222 Id. at 354-58 & n.7, 529 A.2d at 413-15 & n.7. The court repeatedly has urged the
legislature to enact standards to govern this field. Jobes, 108 N.J. at 428, 529 A.2d at
452; Peter, 108 N.J. at 385, 529 A.2d at 429; Farrell, 108 N.J. at 341-42, 486 A.2d at
407; Conroy, 98 N.J. at 344-45, 486 A.2d at 1220-21. In the absence of legislative gui-
dance, however, the court has not hesitated to promulgate its own standards. Indeed,
Justice O'Hern recently suggested that "[a]lthough in some cases we have awaited legis-
lative formulation of standards to vindicate important rights, ... it may be that we
cannot avoid setting the substantive standard in these cases. In a society of diverse
views, the Legislature may be unable to reach any majoritarian judgment." Peter, 108
N.J. at 393, 529 A.2d at 433 (O'Hern, J., dissenting).
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circumstances under which life-sustaining medical care can be with-
drawn. In one case, the Massachusetts Supreme Court identified its
task as "establishing a framework in the law on which the activities
of health care personnel and other persons can find support.9
2 23
The court then spelled out the nature of any patient's right to de-
cline potentially life-prolonging treatment, the legal standards that
control the administration of life-prolonging treatment to incompe-
tent patients, and the procedures that must be followed in making
those decisions.124 The court's exhaustive opinion gave Massachu-
setts families and physicians a detailed blueprint to follow in decid-
ing whether to withdraw life-supporting technology from
incompetent patients.225
In framing procedures to govern the withdrawal of life-sustaining
medical treatment, courts have insured that judges or other non-
medical personnel will retain the ultimate decisionmaking power.
For example, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that a pro-
bate court must determine whether to withhold life-prolonging
treatment from an incompetent patient. The court noted:
[J]udicial resolution of this most difficult and awesome question
[does not] constitut[e] a 'gratuitous encroachment' on the do-
main of medical expertise. Rather, such questions of life and
death . . . require the process of detached but passionate investi-
gation and decision that forms the ideal on which the judicial
branch of government was created. Achieving this ideal is our
responsibility and that of the lower court .... 226
A New York trial court agreed that the courts have a special role
to play in supervising the withdrawal of life-prolonging treatment.
Ideally, the court suggested, these choices should be made by the
family members of an incompetent patient after consulting with the
223 Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 736, 370
N.E.2d 417, 422 (1977).
2 24 
1d., 370 N.E.2d at 422-423.
225 See also Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 224, 741 P.2d 674, 691 (1987) (en
banc) ("The case under immediate consideration concerns only Mildred Rasmussen.
Yet, the principles and procedures articulated herein undoubtedly will govern future
similar cases."); Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1018, 195 Cal. Rptr.
484, 491 (1983) ("We would be derelict in our duties if we did not provide some general
guidelines for future conduct in the absence of ... legislation."); In re Colyer, 99 Wash.
2d 114, 128, 660 P.2d 738, 746 (1983) ("establish[ing] guidelines to be followed to en-
sure that the rights of all parties are adequately protected" in future cases), modified on
other grounds, In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984) (en banc).
226Superintendent of Belchertown, 373 Mass. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 435.
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patient's doctor.2 27 In some cases, however, family members may
be unavailable to decide an incompetent patient's fate or "there
[may be] a dispute or uncertainty as to which course to take.
228
Under these circumstances, judicial review is necessary. "Perhaps,
this is as it should be," the court mused, because judges possess the
" 'detached but passionate' " investigative power identified by the
Massachusetts Supreme Court.
2 2 9
Even when courts have rejected routine judicial review of right-
to-die cases as "impossibly cumbersome, ' 23 ° they have refused to
leave the patient's fate in medical hands. For example, the New
Jersey Supreme Court suggested that hospitals establish "Ethics
Committee[s] composed of physicians, social workers, attorneys,
and theologians" to review the medical prognoses of incompetent
patients and to oversee treatment decisions for those patients.
23' If
hospitals and family members followed this course, their decisions
to withdraw life-prolonging treatment from incompetent patients
would "be without any civil or criminal liability. ' 232 The New
Jersey Supreme Court thus guaranteed that, even without ongoing
judicial involvement, nonmedical personnel would help control the
use of life-sustaining medical technology.
22 7 In re Beth Israel Medical Center, 136 Misc. 2d 931, 937, 519 N.Y.S.2d 511, 515
(1987).
228 Id.
229 Id. (quoting Superintendent of Belchertown, 373 Mass. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 435);
see also Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 225, 741 P.2d 674, 692 (1987) (en banc)
(Feldman, J., concurring) (urging that a judicial hearing should be required before ter-
mination of an incompetent patient's life support); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 136,
660 P.2d 738, 750 (1983) (en banc) ("detached opinion of the judiciary" will be neces-
sary before withdrawal of life-prolonging treatment when there is disagreement among
family members or physicians, when the patient has always been incompetent, when
there is evidence of wrongful motives or malpractice, or when there is no family mem-
ber to serve as guardian), modified on other grounds, In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810,
689 P.2d 1372 (1984) (en banc).
230 Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 50, 355 A.2d at 669.
231 Id. at 49, 355 A.2d at 668 (quoting Teel, The Physician's Dilemma: A Doctor's
View.: What the Law Should Be, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 6, 8 (1975)). For an overview of
ethics committees and their roles, see Merritt, The Tort Liability of Hospital Ethics
Committees, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239 (1987).
232 Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 54, 355 A.2d at 671. The court's decision to entrust nonmedi-
cal committee members with the review of medical prognoses has proven extremely
controversial. See In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 134, 660 P.2d 738, 749 (1983) (en
banc) (citing authorities), modified on other grounds, In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810,
689 P.2d 1372 (1984) (en banc). This delegation of medical decisionmaking to nonmed-
ical personnel, however, underscores the court's determination to place control of medi-
cal technology in lay hands. Almost one-third of all ethics committees continue to
review medical prognoses. See Merritt, supra note 231, at 1244 n.26.
[Vol. 69, 1990]
The Constitution in a Brave New World
Finally, courts adjudicating right-to-die cases have viewed those
cases as unique opportunities to welcome experts from other disci-
plines into the courtroom. As a result, the courts have fostered
their role as fora where representatives of medicine, ethics, sociol-
ogy, and other disciplines can meet to resolve the intractable
problems of modem technology. The Massachusetts Supreme
Court observed: "'The law always lags behind the most advanced
thinking in every area. It must wait until the theologians and the
moral leaders and events have created some common ground, some
consensus.' '233 Legal decisionmaking, therefore, "is furthered by
seeking the collective guidance of those in health care, moral ethics,
philosophy, and other disciplines. ' ' 234 Another court agreed that
the withdrawal of life-prolonging medical treatment "raises moral,
social, technological, philosophical, and legal questions involving
the interplay of many disciplines. No one person or profession has
all the answers.
2 35
As a result of these wide-ranging inquiries, lawsuits involving
life-sustaining medical technologies sometimes serve as a focal point
of public debate. During 1975 and 1976, the New York Times pub-
lished more than one hundred articles about Karen Quinlan as her
case wound its way through the New Jersey courts.2 36 The Quinlan
suit prompted individuals around the country to formulate their
own views on the use of life-prolonging medical technologies. In
Gray v. Romeo,237 for example, a family member reported that the
incompetent patient had discussed the plight of Karen Quinlan and
concluded that "she would not want a respirator or a feeding tube if
she were in the same circumstances.
2 38
233 Superintendent of Belchertown, 373 Mass. at 737, 370 N.E.2d at 423 (quoting Bur-
ger, The Law and Medical Advances, 67 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. SuPP. 7, 15, 17
(1967)).
234 Id. at 736, 370 N.E.2d at 422.
235 In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 344, 486 A.2d 1209, 1220 (1985); see also Rasmussen
v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 211, 741 P.2d 674, 678 (1987) ("As more individuals assert
their right to refuse medical treatment, more frequently do the disciplines of medicine,
law, philosophy, technology, and religion collide. This interdisciplinary interplay raises
many questions to which no single person or profession has all the answers."); In re
Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 418 n.ll, 529 A.2d 434, 446 n. ll (1987) ("Public opinion is rele-
vant in the withdrawal-of-treatment cases that we decide today because they present
society with moral, social, technological, and philosophical problems that transcend
legal issues.").
236 See The New York Times Index 1976, at 1406; 2 The New York Times Index
1975, at 2041.
237 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988), attorney's fees awarded, 709 F. Supp. 325 (D.R.I.
1989).
2 38 Id. at 583.
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Courts have recognized this potential for lawsuits to stimulate
public debate over life-sustaining medical technologies. Justice
O'Hern, of the New Jersey Supreme Court, reminded his colleagues
that "as painful as the publicity [surrounding right-to-die cases] is,
the cases provoke 'continuing and widespread public dialogue.
Gradually, such dialogue may develop lines of consensus regarding
societal values upon which the courts can draw.' ",239 The courts,
therefore, have welcomed their new role as instigators and modera-
tors of public debate.
In sum, cases challenging modern technology have prompted
courts to cultivate a multi-faceted judicial role. Judges have moved
beyond the confines of particular controversies to consider the
broader social implications of technological innovation and recom-
mend appropriate responses to that change. In reaching those deci-
sions, courts have invited representatives of science, medicine,
ethics, and philosophy to test their competing perspectives in the
courtroom. By creating these fora for the interplay of many disci-
plines, judges have used courtroom controversies to focus public de-
bate on the social implications of modern technology. Through this
innovation, courts have assured their place as mediators of the
ongoing conflict between technological change and social mores.
CONCLUSION
In 1789, shortly after ratification of the Constitution, Thomas
Jefferson looked ahead to the benefits a constitutional government
would bring. "We have spent the prime of our lives," Jefferson
wrote, "in procurring [for the young] the precious blessing of lib-
erty. Let them spend theirs in showing that it is the great parent of
science and of virtue; and that a nation will be great in both, always
in proportion as it is free." 2" Jefferson grasped the fundamental
connection between constitutional liberty and technology, but he
underestimated the complexity of their relationship.
As Jefferson expected, the Constitution has fostered technological
239 In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 393, 529 A.2d 419, 433-34 (1987) (O'Hern, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Baron, Medicine and Human Rights: Emerging Substantive Standards
and Procedural Protections for Medical Decision Making Within the American Family,
17 FAM. L.Q. 1, 22 (1983)); see also In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 362, 529 A.2d 404, 417
(1987) (O'Hern, J., concurring) (Case-by-case adjudication may "[g]radually . . . de-
velop lines of consensus regarding the moral and social values upon which future courts
can draw.").
240 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Willard (Mar. 24, 1789), quoted in D.
MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 84-85 (1951).
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growth. During the last hundred years, the courts have upheld the
constitutionality of technologies as diverse as universal vaccination
and computerized recordkeeping. At the same time, however,
judges have restrained the use of technological improvements when
those changes threatened to overwhelm individual liberties. Today,
courts approach technological change with caution, approving in-
novations that promise social benefits while restricting inventions
that compromise individual rights.
Jefferson, moreover, overlooked the role that technology would
play in altering the course of constitutional law. The potential
abuses of eugenic sterilization, computerized data banks, and life-
prolonging medical treatments led courts to embrace a constitu-
tional philosophy centered on individual rights rather than one pre-
mised on social duties. These controversies prompted judges to
expand constitutional principles by recognizing important new con-
stitutional interests. Technology, therefore, has enriched constitu-
tional law just as the Constitution has encouraged technology.
Finally, technological change has cultivated new judicial roles.
Unwilling to countenance every technological advance, courts have
attempted to probe the social repercussions of new technologies. In
order to fulfill this function, judges have invited scientists, philoso-
phers, ethicists, and other social thinkers into the courtroom. These
wide-ranging judicial inquiries, in turn, have stimulated public de-
bate over the uses of technology and helped forge new social
attitudes.
Technology has spawned a new world of computers, mechanical
respirators, and genetic manipulation. Constitutional adjudication
has insured that society maintained individual rights while still ben-
efiting from these advances. As Thomas Jefferson hoped, the mag-
nitude of our science has remained proportionate to the greatness of
our freedom.

